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MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL 
SOCIETY' et al. 
Cert to CA 9 
(Sneed, Kennedy concurring, 
Larson, D.J., dissenting) 
Fcc;]eral/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Is the fixing of max imu.m amounts which 
physician members of a medical foundation agree to accept as full 
payment for services rendered to subscribing patien ts a per se 
.. ' , · 
violation of the Sherman Act? 
. ' 
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2. FACTS: Resps are foundations for medical care (FMCs). 
, FMCs approve and administer insurance plans underwritten by 
private insurers. FMCs serve as agents for the underwriters, 
drawing funds directly from insurers' bank accounts to pay 
doctors' bills. Other activities of the FMCs include the 
setting of minimum standards and performing peer review. They 
are an alternative to closed panel pre-paid health insurance 
plans, commonly known as health maintenance organiz a tions or 
HMOs. FMCs establish maximum amounts which they will reimburse 
member physicians for ~erforming specific services; the 
physicians agree to accept this amount, or any lesser amount they 
may charge, as payment in full from covered patients. Physician 
members are periodically polled concerning what the maximum level 
of reimbursement should be. The state of Arizona brought the 
instant suit, charging that the fixing of the maximum prices 
which will be reimbursed to participting physicians through FM.Cs 
' was a form of price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. The 
state moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that 
resps' price fixing activities were a per se violation of §1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. 
3. DECISION BELOW: The DC (Copple) denied the motion, 
citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977) as indicating a trend away from the per se rule and citing 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975 ) and National 
Societv of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 
(197&) as indicating that the per se. rule should be applied to 





affirm~d, ~ach judge writing separately. Judge Sneed stressed 
that the record below revealed nothing about the actual _________ ___c:-----
competitive effects of the challenged arrangement, and noted . --------~------=---- . . 11 [i1n truth, we know very little about the impact of this and 
many other arrangements within the health care industry. This 
alone should make us reluctant to invoke a per se rule with 
respect to the challenged arrangement." Judge Sneed also noted 
that it was uncertain exactly what competitive model should 
prevail in the health care industry. He stated that professions 
had only recently come within the ambit of the Sherman Act, and 
that the supply and demand functions in the health care industry 
hardly approximated those that would prevail in a purely private 
competitive order. Judge Sneed also quoted Broadca s t Music, 441 
"---' U.S. 1, 9 (1979) for the proposition that whether to classify 
something as "per se price fixing" "will often, but not always, 
be a simple matter". He argued that the question was hardly 
simple in this case, since the record was devoid of any 
indications of competitive effects, the petitioner state itself 
reimbursed physicians at rates higher than those established by 
the FMCs, nothing indicated that physician's profits had been 
increased by the challenged conduct, it was unlikely that 
insurance carriers would supinely stand by and perm i t physicians 
to exercise monopoly power, and there was no indica t ion on the 
record of the interaction of other economic actors in the health 
care-•field. Judge Sneed also "drew comfort II from the statements 
in National Society of Professional Engineers and Goldfarb, that 
restraints regulating professional conduct may pas s muster under 
- 4 -
the rule. of reason while they would not in the purely commercial 
context. Juage Kennedy concurred, agreeing with Judge Sneed that 
the court knew too little about the effects on competition 
produced by the challenged practices to brand them per se 
violations. He stressed that this was not to say, however, that 
a per se rule may not be proper after the facts have been 
developed, or that the practices necessarily passed muster under 
rule of reason analysis. Judge Larson dissented. He argued that 
it was clear that the challenged activities constituted maximum 
.. price fixing by competitors, and that this was per se illegal 
regardless of any special industry factors. Albrecht v. Herald 
Co • , 3 9 0 U • S . 1. 4 5 , 15 1-5 3 ( 19 6 8 ) ; K i e fer -stew a rt Co . v . Se a g ram & 
Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). He argued that there was nothing 
new about maximum price fixing schemes which would counsel 
against application of the per se rule. He noted that the price 
fixing was wholly commercial in nature and bore no relation to 
any public service aspect of the profession which might suggest 
departure from the usual rule. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that in ruling that the 
reasonableness of the price fixed by the physicians through the 
FMCs is a defense to price fixing, the CA put itself in conflict 
with the decisions of this Court and other circuits. In Catalano 
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct at 1927, this court 
recently emphasized that "It has long been settled .:hat an 
agre·emeht to fix prices is unlawful p_er se. It is no excuse that 
the prices fixed are themselves reasonable." Petr argues, citing 
the cases relied upon by Judge Larson, that this Court has long 
- 5 -
held that horizontal maximum price fixing is per se unlawful. 
Finally, petrs contend that the CA created a special standard of 
liabil~ty for a professional group, contrary to National Society 
of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 689 (rejecting argument 
that "because of the special characteristics of a particular 
industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and 
commerce than competition"). 
Resps reply that there is no maximum price fixing involved. 
Physician foundation members are free to charge whatever prices 
they desire. The maximums in question are simply the maximum 
which the physician will be reimbursed by the insurance carrier 
for services rendered to a patient participating in an insurance 
plan endorsed by the FMC. Physicians charging less will be 
reimbursed less. Physicians who are not members of the FMC and 
treat an FMC patient are free to look to the patient for any 
excess over the maximum amount which they may charge. Physicians 
treating non-FMC patients may charge and collect amounts over the 
reimbursement maximum for FMC patients. Resps stress that the 
record evidence does not establish that the FMCs exercise any 
control whatsoever over the prices physicians charge. Resps 
maintain that the fact that 85-95% of the physicians in the 
county serviced by the resp FMCs billed at or above the maximum 
reimbursement levels should come as no surprise, since medical 
fees have been rising and maximum reimbursement levels have not 
changed since 1977. Resps contend that petr miscontrues the CA 
decision. The CA did not hold that reasonableness was a defense 
to price fixing, it simply required, as the Court did in 
( 
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Continental T.V., ~33 U.S. at 58-59, that departures from the 
rule of reason must be based upo'n demonstrable economic effect. 
The majority determined that the challenged conduct, on the 
present record, could not be characterized as price fixing, not 
that horizontal maximum price fixing is not a per se violation. 
Petrs reply that the distinction resps seek to draw between 
fixing levels of reimbursement and actual price fixing is a 
distinction without a difference. Petrs repeat their contention 
that the CA did make reasonableness a defense to price fixing, 
citing language in the opinion that "the relevant inquiry becomes 
whether fees paid to doctors under that system would be Jess than 
those payable under the FMC maximum fee agreement." 
Three amici have filed briefs in support of petr: the 
American Association of Retired Persons and the National Retired 
Teachers Association, the Gray Panthers, and the attorney 
generals of 43 states. 
5. DISCUSSION: This Court has on several occasions 
cautioned that per se rules should not be applied in situations 
in which the Court was not fully familiar with the industry and 
the economic effects o( the various practices. See, e.g., 
Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9 ("it is only after considerable 
experience with certain business relationships that courts 
classify them as per se violations") (quoting United States v. 
Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)). The bulk of 
Judge Sneed's opinion was devoted to exploring thi s lack of 
knowledge, not to accepting reasonableness of prices as a defense 
to price fixing. Judge Kennedy's concurrence was clearly based 
.. 
- 7 -
on the court's lack of knowledge and the fact that special 
considerations may come into play when dealing with a profession. 
The CA's refusal to brand the FMC maximum reimbursement schedules 
as per se violations of the Sherman Act seems sensible in view of 
the status of the record. 
I recommen~ denial. 
There is a response. 
10/26/80 
,JBP 
Roberts Op in petn. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell November 3, 1981 
From: John Wiley 
No. 80-419: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, et al. 
Question Presented 
Whether an association of doctors commits a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act when it collectively sets maximum 
medical service reimbursement rates to be paid by third party 
insurance plans the association has approved. 
I. Background 
The pr icing arrangement in this suit is complicated. 
I will review the facts in some detail because the issue of the 
appropriateness of a per se pricing rule depends crucially on 
the,characterization of the record. 
The State of Arizona brought this antitrust action 
~~ ~ 2. 
~ k ~ b"-f ~ 
 
against four entities: {Dt.he Maricopa County Medical Society 
(Maricopa Society); t ~ Mar ico~ undation for Medical care 
(Maricopa Foundation); th~ ima County Medical Society (Pima 
Society) ; 1 and th~ ima Found:7on-;or Medical Care (Pima Foun-
dation). The Societies apparently are doctors' ~ a-
tions for the named counties. They formed the Foundations (in 
1969 in Maricopa County, J.A. 210, and in 1971 in Pima County, 
It 
J.A. 171) in order to promote a particular type of medical fee 
arrangement: "fee-for-service medicine." J.A. 171 & 210. 
This arrangement exchanges dollars for particular medical ser-
vices and contrasts with work performed for a salary basis. 
See Petr brief at 5 n.4. 
Foundation membership is open to all doctors in the 
area; about 70% of Maricopa doctors have joined. The Founda-
tions were governed by the administrative staff of the Societ-
ies. 2 
risk. 
The Foundations themselves do not insure against the 
Rather they approve of and perform services for large 
separate insurers, including Blue Shield and private for-profit 
insurers. The Foundations' services basically are those of a 
1The Pima Society settled out of this suit according to a con-
sent judgment that, inter alia, eliminated the institutional 
links between it and the Pima Foundation. 
2originally members elected to governing positions in the 
Societies selected those to serve on the Foundations' governing 
boards. J.A. 189. Since the CA9's decision, the Foundations 
have amended their bylaws so as to select their Board of Trustees 
by 'their membership's direct election. See Resp brief at 10 
n.30, A-6 - A-7, & A-9 - A-11. --
3. 
claims agents. They review (to some extent) the need for the ---------medical 
charged. 
service for which 
~
They pay (if the 
A.-
a member doctor has rendered and 
procedure is approved as necessary 
and is billed at a rate not in excess of the Foundations' maxi------------------------------------
mum schedule) the physician's bill from the insurers' account. 
To obtain Foundation approval, the insurers must agree ~ 
to pay member physicians for services they render to insureds ~ 
at the physicians' usual and customary fees. But these fees ~ 
~ are not to exceed a maximum price schedule that the Foundations 1--'t-,L 
set. The participating doctors in turn agree to serve consum-~ 
~ 
ers of the Foundations' approved insurance plans and to limit ~h 
their fees to usual and customary levels not exceeding the~ 
Foundations' maximum schedules . . 
Insurance consumers in the Foundation-approved plans 
are guaranteed full coverage of their medical bills if they are 
treated by member doctors. These consumers are free to visit 
nonmember doctors, however, and they are assured that the in-
surer will pay for these usual and customary medical bills up 
to the Foundations' maximum fee. But nothing prevents non-
participating doctors from charging more than this fee. If 
they do so, the consumer personally is responsible for the ex-
cess. Consumers in the Foundation-approved plans thus have an 
incentive to visit only participating doctors to ensure the 
approved insurer picks up the entire bill. 
Arizona's suit focuses on the Foundations' maximum 
price schedules. These schedules were formulated on a tenta-
C 
4. 
tive basis by polling the Foundations' member physicians; the 
members then voted on whether to adopt the proposed schedule. 3 
The level of these fees in relation to other doctor fees--
especially those charged by the 70% member doctors for non-
Foundation work and those charged by 30% non-member Maricopa 
doctors for their general practice--is the subject of much dis-
pute.4 No formal rules prevent doctors from charging less than 
the maximum schedules; indeed, the Foundations vigorously as-
sert that their member doctors have agreed that they must re-
main free to set their own charges. See Resp brief at 9-10 & 
n.28. Similarly, the Foundations do not have rules that pre-
vent their member doctors from participating with competing 
insurance plans. 
The mark~ s~ are of Foundation-approved insurance 
plans is disputed. Petr asserts that the Maricopa Foundation 
plans account for "approximately" 63% of the market, as opposed 
31 J.A. 198 ,1,1 34 & 36; 202 ,1,1 54 & 55. After Arizona filed -=' 
this suit, the Foundations changed their practice of formulating 
and approving the maximum fees according to member votes. Now 
the Foundations' maximum fee schedules are set solely by their 
Board of Trustees. Resp brief at 10 & n.29. 
4The CA9 observed that 85-95% of Maricopa doctors bill at or 
above the Maricopa Foundation's maximum level. Petn App. at r 
This is not a very helpful statistic as it does not reveal wheth-
er the Foundation's maximum fees are at or below average billing 
levels. The CA9 further observed that the record does not con-
tain data permitting a comparison of the Foundations' maximum 
fees with average state fees. Id. at n.3. Arizona claims, howev-
er, that the Foundations' fee schedules exceed statewide levels. 
Petr brief at 7 & n.7. The respondents contest this. Resp brief 
at 18-19. 
5. 
to 16% for health maintenance organizations ("HMO's," such as 
the Kaiser plan), and 21% for other indemnification plans. 
Petr brief at 5 n.4. Resp vigorously contests the accuracy of 
this data, claiming it is "disingenuous" to attempt to calcu-
late market shares from "this small, unrepresentative sample • 
II Resp brief at 11 n.31. Apparently the record contains 
no information regarding the changes in market share over time. 
On this record, the DC refused to grant Arizona's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction and for summary judgment. 
The CA9 accepted the certified question of whether this fee 
arrangement is per se illegal. The CA9 rejected Arizona's con-
tention and affirmed (over one dissent). 
II. Discussion 
/ 
At this stage in the litigation, this case is governed 
by Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8-9, 19-20 (1979). 
The question is whether this suspicion-arousing arrangement can 
claim sufficient justification to avoid the fatal "price fix-
ing" characterization. This requires an understanding of the 
purpose and function of this pricing arrangement. 5 
5T f h . h f d V" . 1" . . wo cases rom t 1s Court ave oun vert1ca max..unum price 
fixing to be illegal. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 
(1968) ~ Kiefer-Stewart C~v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 
U.S. 211 (l95l). This case has a horizontal aspe_£.t that could be 
used to distinguish these E"wo case s. More candidly, however, 
v these decisions are suspect and should not control the sound and 
traditional approach of Broadcast Music. For elaboration, I re-
fer you to pages 2-5 of the Easterbrook artl.£J.e (attached) you 
asked me to examine. I think h i s comments are essentially sound. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~ ~/:i:n-u '-A - ( I ._ , J 6' - __. ~ 6 • D"~~ ,-~ 
~~(~ 
I ,, 
When price fixing sets a minimum price, its motivation 
is clear: to increase producers' revenues in anticompetitive 
fashion. But the motivation for maximum pr ice fixing is less 
apparent; absent further explanation, it appears to disadvan-
tage those who under take it. A number of motivations can be 
offered as reasons why an industry would seek to limit prices 
collectively. 6 The one asserted by the resps in this case is 
I differ semantically by thinking attention should not be devoted 
to wrestling over whether per se treatment differs for maximum 
and minimum pr icing arrangements. Rather I would simply focus 
attention on the asserted justification for the pricing 
arrangement--whatever its character. This alligns with recent 
precedent, e.g., Broadcast Music; Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 
Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646 n.8 (1980), and ensures that DCs treat 
price arrangements among competitors with due wariness. 
Easterbrook would not, I think, have serious disagreements with 
this focus on asserted justification and this condemnation absent 
adequate justification. See Easterbrook at 7 ("If sellers have 
no plausible--that is, profitable--reason for reducing their 
prices, we may infer that any given maximum price agreement is 
actually a traditional cartel in disguise."). ~~ 
6Easterbrook sets forth three types of efficiencies that an ~ 
in~dst might be able to acfiTeve c firou gn'"'1ITT{x 1mum price setting. 
Th fir is that a subset on the industry might want to identify , 
itse to consumers as low-priced. The motive for this - t ype of ~ 
agreeme n t , a Rl. n to aavert i sing, ' would be to lower consumer search 
costs, thus increasing tne subset's sales to these informed con-
sumers. Easterbrook at 7-9. 
The ~ '> efficiency would economize on transactions 
costs. Thes~ are of four types. (1) Maximum fee sched-
ules permit both doctors and patients to avoid the costl rocess r~ 
of learning t e prev 1 1ng mar or complex proce ures. 
(2) They permit fees to be established in advance of emergency 
treatment. (3) They reduce insurers' costs of supervising doc-
tor/patient transactions to ensure that economical decisions are 
being made. (4) They reducing the expense of bargaining over 
fees. Easterbr~ at 10-13. 
The hir efficiency is that maximum pr ice schedules 
p~rmi t doctor market a "new product:" to of fer their ser-
ices in a manner that insures consumers against the risk of both 
eed and expense for medical care. Easterbrook at 13-15. This 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
the importance of maximum pr ice schedules to the abilil ty of 
doctors to offer a pro-competitive new "unique product." Resps 
.__ ---- - _______.. 
brief at 37. 
Although resps do not spell out all the analysis need-
' 
ed to . 'f JUSt y their assertion, I am persuaded--weakly--that 
their claim is credible. The ~ ique product:Jis 100% prepaid 
medical service provided by consumer-selected providers. This 
~
combination of medical service choice and 100% insurance ap-~ 
pears to be something that neither separate insurers nor indi-
vidual physicians can furnish economically without maximum 
price schedules. Separate medical insurers working without an 
advance maximum fee understanding with doctors must either bar-
gain with each doctor over billing prior to each insured' s 
treatment (a costly and--in emergency situations--often impos-
sible task), must reserve the option of refusing to pay part of 
the doctor's bill (thus preventing the insurer from guarantee-
ing the insured 100% coverage), or must pay whatever the treat-
ing physician decides to charge after the services are 
performed--a situation ripe with possibilities for "blackmail" 
by doctors. Such "blackmail" could increase insurers' costs 
and drive insurance rates beyond competitive levels. 
Alternatively, individual doctors cannot offer 100% 
prepaid service unless they combine into groups large enough to 
last economy is particularly important in this case. See pages 
7~8 of this memo. 
8. 
take advantage of the risk smoothing that allows insurers to 
forecast individually uncertain risks in accurate aggregate 
terms. Large "firms" of doctors that pay each on a salary ba-
sis could assume this function. Indeed, this is my understand-
ing of the definition of an HMO. See Havighurst, Health Main-
tenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 L. 
& Contemp. Problems 716, 718-20 (1970). For doctors who prefer 
the advantages of a sole practioner's life 7 and for consumers 
who prefer wider freedom to select their treating doctor, how-
ever, some type of arrangement with a separate insurer must be 
made if economical 100% prepaid financing is to be offered. 
The need for doctors to offer such an arrangement could become 
pressing if that is what consumers prefer. There is some evi-
dence that it is. See resp brief at 11 n.31. 8 
7The ability of doctors to take the initiative to preserve a 
sole practitioner, or "fee-for-service," working arrangement 
seems to me to be the real issue in this suit. Without empicial 
support, I assume some doctors are fond of this billing arrange-
ment because they believe it allows them to make more money. ~ 
(There are, of course, all the additional intangibles of working 
for oneself in a small business. I conjecture that the choice 
might be similar to deciding whether to work as a lawyer in a 
corporation at a set salary versus working in a partnership where 
earnings are on more of a "fee-for-service" basis.) The consum-
ers' greater freedom in selecting individual doctors in the 
Foundations' prepaid system must convince consumers who are will-
ing to pay for these plans that there is a discernable quality 
difference in the treatment available. 
8This combination of physicians and insurers amounts to an 
"integration" if it permits greater efficiency. As its result, 
consumers presumably can obtain 100% prepayment of medical ser-
vices of quality not available in HMO alternatives. (If consum-
eis cannot, the Foundations' plans soon will be out of business.) 
This "integration" responds to §D of the SG's brief (horizontal 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
The Foundations assert that they are designed to main-
tain the fee-for-service arrangement. See page 2 supra. The 
analysis just reviewed suggests this is what they to do in 
fact. Indeed, even Professor Havighur st--one of the Founda-
tions' most persistent critics--concedes that "foundations are ,---...__-
dedicated to lowering costs and improving quality and have been 
shown to have some beneficial effects." Havighurst, Profes-
sional Restraints on Health Care Financing, 1978 Duke L. J. 
303, 377. This legitimating explanation does distinguish this 
maximum price fixing/insurance arrangement from a run-of-the-
mill per se illegal minimum pricing collusion. The explanation 
is not strong, however, because the Foundations do not defend 
why pr ice setting by 70% of the doctors is necessary to the 
type of product now offered. It would seem this price schedul-
ing activity could be performed by insurers who are independent 
of the organized medical community. See Ohio amicus brief at 
15-24. One thus should be sympathetic to petr 's claims that 
maximum pricing per se illegal without absent showing that it is 
necessary to "cooperative productive agreement") and §IIA of 
Petr's Reply (no issue for trial because there is no economic 
integration). Whether the benefits of the integration justify 
its anticompetitive potential, of course, is the rule of reason 
issue that remains for trial after the instant per se question 
has been settled. See, e.g., Petn App. (Kennedy, J. , concurring 
in decision below) ("This is not to suggest, however, that I have 
found these reimbursement schedules to be per se proper, that an 
examination of these practices under the rule of reason at trial 
will not reveal the proscribed adverse effect on competition, or 
that this court is foreclosed at some later date, when it has 
more evidence, from concluding that such schedues do constitute 
p~r se violations."). 
? 
10. 
this arrangement will injure competitive activity. But petr 
fails to present a convincing argument on this point. 
The weakest aspect of the p~r's case is its schizo--phrenic failure to decide whether the maximum pr ice schedule 
harms consumers by raising or by lowering otherwise prevailing 
prices. 9 On one hand, petrs are willing to "assume, for the 
sake of argument, that respondents' fee schedules set 
maximum rather than minimum fees II Petr brief at 28 
n.35 (emphasis added). Genuine maximum pr ices do not cause 
traditional injury of cartel-like minimum pr ice fixing 
variety.lo Easterbrook surveys the possible injuries that such 
9This divided attitude can be seen in the dissent from the 
opinion below. Compare Petn App at 28 ( "defendants have quite 
openly stated that their purpose is to protect fee-for-service 
medicine against competing forms of health care delivery") (note 
that such "protection" could only be achieved by holding down 
pr ices to exclude these competing forms--unless other predatory 
tactics, which are not alleged, have been employed) with id. at 
30 ("I am confident that the fee schedule does have the effect of 
raising prices, and that in 'its absence consumers would ultimate-
ly obtain less expensive medical care.") (emphasis added). 
lOProfessor Sullivan identifies three possible motivations for 
maximum prices: to deter entry into the industry; to discourage 
innovation-competition; and to ration short-run shortages. L. 
Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Anti trust 211-12 (1977). Petr 
does not argue that any of these hazards are dangers of the ar-
rangement in question. 
Much of the commentary on which petr's brief relies does 
explain maximum fee schedules as devices to limit entry. E.g., 
Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control By Third Party Payors: Fee 
Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 Duke L.J. 645, 681 ("Profes-
sor Havighurst has forcefully argued that the very purpose of 
[foundations] is to set an entry-discouraging price that will 
preclude other forms of third party competition and thus that a 
p~r se rule would be appropriate to condemn them. Indeed, an 
antitrust rule against horizontally fixing maximum, as opposed to 
minimum, prices makes sense only because of the probability that 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-
11. 
agreements could create. In my view, he convincingly rebuts 
such fears--at least for this record. 11 
On the other hand, petr suggests that "there is much 
to argue that what is involved here is a minimum or uniform fee 
schedule." Petr brief at 28 n.35 (emphasis added). But the 
arrangement by its terms does not fix minimum prices. Petr's ------ --argument thus must be that circulation of a maximum schedule 
causes "conscious parallelism" or implicit collusion. Whether ~ 
this can be judged on this record is a closer question. Such 
an inquiry generally should examine industrial structure, his-
tory, and behavior to determine whether the arrangement 
facilates the operation of a cartei. 12 But such information is 
entry-limiting pr icing is involved.") (footnotes omitted) . This 
limit price theory holds that the fee schedules are holding down 
the prices that otherwise would prevail. 
11see Easterbrook at 19-22. 
12see L. Sullivan at 270-73 (analyzing United States v. Contain-
er<:orp., 393 U.S. U.S. 333 (1969), and the analysis it suggests , 
for price information programs); Easterbrook at 15-18 (outlining ~ 
similar inquiry). The majority below acknowleged that resps will 
have to survive such an inquiry before this litigation is com-
plete. See Petn App at 7-8 (citing a predecessor of the Contain-
er case:--American Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 268 U.S. 563 
(1925)). 
In one of his few examinations of the arrangement in 
question, the SG observes that doctors will not have an incentive 
to charge less than the maximum fees specified in the schedule. 
This is true, and it is definitely a troubling feature of this 
arrangement. But it is in the insurers' interest to avoid rather 
than to facilitate a doctors' cartel. Insurers' premiums will 
suffer if their "stable" of doctors uses the insurance program to 
raise prices above those of the rest of the industry. One thus 
wquld expect insurers to abandon the Foundations' pr ice setting 
if it leads to cartelized price increases. Because there are no 
impediments that I am aware of to such action by insurers, it is 
Footnote continued on next page. 
12. 
not in this record. 
I conclude that, in effect, ~~ has raised a prima 
facie case of pricing fixing by showing a horizontal agreement 
for setting prices. ~s rebut this application of the per se 
rule by showing a weak but credible redeeming justification--
the otherwise-impossible availabili t of 100% repaid medical 
care of consumer-chosen quality. Petr now fails to overcome 
this rebuttal by pointing to any substantiated competitive haz-
ard. If fact, petr presents no consistent theory at all of how 
the arrangement in question injures consumers. This is quite 
---.., 
different than the typical per se situation in which the summa-
ry rule is justified by an obvious threat of competitive inju-
ry. 
The basis for this holding should be the Broadcast 
Music rationale--not that there is no per se rule againt maxi-
1~ 
difficult to condemn the arrangement without more information on 
the structure of the insurance and medical industries. Cf. 
Havighurst, supra, 35 L. & Contemporary Problems, at 774 ("A per :' 
se rule should probably not be adopted without a full judicial 
inquiry into the nature and functioning of foundations plans, and 
the outcome of such an inquiry is not easy to predict.") (foot-
note omitted). 
Whether such structural hazards exist as to render doc-
tors' maximum price schedules unacceptable is an appropriate sub-
ject of inquiry on remand. The Court should say so in its opin-
ion. A particularly troublesome point--not illuminated on the 
present record--is whether the Foundation insurers primarily are 
doctor-dominated Blue Shield/Blue Cross organizations. If so, 
this cause for concern--when joined with the fact that the Foun-
dations themselves need not set fees for this arrangement to 
work--quite possibility would be enough to condemn this arrange-
ment under an expanded analysis on remand. , 
13. 
mum price fixing. In my view, this is as much an insurance 
case as it is a maximum price case. Without the insurance ra-
tionale, the price arrangement would have no justification and 
should be per se illegal. 
The arrangement still has hazards that are grave--as 
one would expect when competitors gather to decide anything 
about their price. See note 12 supra. The Court should make 
clear in its opinion that these hazards are serious. But these 
should be examined on a fuller record in accord with the analy-
sis suggested by the Container case. See note 12 supra. The 
CA9 decision should be affirmed and the case remanded for fur-
ther proceedings. 
III. Conclusion 
The suggestions from Albrect and Kiefer-Stewart that 
maximum price fixing always be found per se illegal are inade-
quately reasoned to control this case. In line with Broadcast 
Music, resps present a justification for their pr icing prac-
tice. In particular, resps point out that the maximum fee 
------ -----schedule s are necessary to provision of an otherwise uneconomi-
cal product: 100% prepaid medical service provided by the doc-
tor of the consumer's choice. This necessitates further factu-
al examination of the practice's asserted benefits and harms. 
Since petr presents no coherent credible theory about how this 
ar.:rangement is likely to cause consumer injury, the maximum 
schedule should not be invalidated on a per se basis at this 
• • 14 . 
stage of the litigation. The practice of doctors' voting to 
set their own reimbursement levels is worrisome, however, par-
ticularly when the practice involves such a large segment (70%) 
of the medical community and does not seem essential to the 
"new product" tht is offered. The arrangement may well prove 
vulnerable under a more complete examination. The case should 
be affirmed and remanded for this fuller factual development ---and analysis. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell November 5, 1981 
From: John Wiley 
No. 80-419: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, et al. 
Upon further reflection· (and writing out my added 
analysis), I now adhere to my original recommendation that you 
vote to remand with careful instructions as to further proceed-
ings. 
The test that should govern this case is that pr ice 
agreements among competitors are illegal per se unless (1) they 
achieve an economic efficiency (an "integration") and (2) they 
are necessary to that integration. This traditional law was 
applied most recently in Broadcast Music. The maximum pr ice 
schedules here at issue satisfy the first er i ter ion because 
they make economical 100% prepaid medical insurance a feasible 




at pages 7-8. 
The more troublesome issue is whether the doctors' 
extensive participation in the formulation of these maximum 
pr ice schedules is necessary to the economy achieved by the 
arrangement. The doctors claim that administratively it is 
easier for them, rather than the insurance companies, to formu-
late these schedules. There is some administrative cost sav-
ings, as I will show. The problem in this case is to balance 
the likely size of this efficiency against the collusive threat 
posed by the doctors' pricing activity. 
1. The efficiency savings achieved by doctor consulta-
tion is not great. The Foundations' pr ice scheduling would 
seem to occur in three basic steps: (1) identifying the dif-
ferent types of medical procedures, (2) tentatively determining 
a market price, and (3) signing up individual doctors who agree 
to be bound by the proposed price. The first step is a type of 
"start-up cost" that has already been accomplished for Maricopa 
county; insurance companies can adopt the organization and rel-
ative values of the existing fee schedules as a starting point. 
Organized doctor participation is not necessary. 
The second step is a consultative process. The Foun-
dation management surveys various doctors and specialty groups 
to form tentative price proposals. See J.A. 198-203 at,, 34, 
36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 54, 57, & 58. It seems to me that the in-
dividual insurers would follow exactly the same pattern of con-
sultation. The Foundations would achieve some administrative 
3. 
cost savings by avoiding the need for each insurer to perform 
this activity individually. 
The third step, if performed solely by insurers, also 
~ ------"-"""" --, 
could follow the Foundations' current practice. Doctors could 
join an insurer's plan and vote on price proposals in the same 
manner that they now join the Foundations and vote on their 
price proposals. I imagine that a vote to reject the schedules 
would lead to negotiation, compromise, and a new proposed 
schedule--as seems to be the practice at present. See petr 
brief fact statement at 9-12. Again, the Foundation could 
achieve some administrative cost savings by avoiding the dupli-
cation that would occur with seven different fee negotiations 
and votes. 
I conclude the only real efficiency savings that the 
Foundations offer is the avoidance of duplication costs in the 
polling and voting by doctors. 1 These saving, however, seem 
quite real; the petr certainly has not demonstrated that they 
are de minimis. 
2. The threat of collusion among doctors does not 
1 rt may be possible to achieve these cost savings through the 
use of an independent agency that performs this costing function 
for the Maricopa medical community. The petr, however, does not 
propose this and the practicality of such an arrangement is open 
to some question. I do not think this record is adequate to say 
presently that this is a viable alternative to the existing ar-
rangement • 
... ; - . 
4. 
seem overwhelming. The medical industry is not concentrated. 
There are many independent producers, especially when compared 
with industries like automobile manufacture or steel produc-
tion. Implicit price agreement thus is less likely. And the 
insurers have an interest in lowering the cost of their pay-
ments to doctors so as to keep their own insurance premiums 
competitive. The insurance companies therefore have an inter-
est contrary to that of any doctors' cartel, which would seek 
to increase medical pr ices. This makes it less likely that 
insurance companies will permit the insurance maximum pr ice 
schedules to become a means of doctor cartel pricing. 
On the other hand, common sense shows some threat of 
collusion lurks every time competitors meet to discuss common 
concerns. This threat is heighted when the discussion explic-
itly centers on price. Moreover, the traditional professional 
norms of doctors regard vigorous price competition as unprofes-
sional. The profession is accustomed to collective control 
over price. 
I conclude that the threat of collusion, while 
overwhelming, is present in some degree. 
not ~ 
Given the real but relatively small risk of collusion 
present in this industry, I conclude this record is insuff i-------cient to establish this risk outweighs the real but unknown 
efficiency savings the Foundations' arrangement permits. I 
therefore stick to my original recommendation to remand. This 
~ 
5. 
disposition in essence is an application of the burden of proof 
in these cases. Petr as plaintiff and as movant for summary 
judgment has the burden of persuasion. Here there is enough 
doubt about the justification for and threat from the arrange-
ment under attack to hold that petr has not discharged its bur-
den. 
The remand should be accompanied by careful instruc-
tions. These should focus the DC's inquiry and avoid an ill-
defined and endless voyage into the rule of reason. Pre se 
prohibition may yet be appropriate, if petr can establish (1) 
alternative feasible institutional structures could achieve 
most of the economies of the present arangement with a lower 
threat of collusion or (2) the nature of this industry, as 
shown by a Container type of structural and historical analy-
sis, renders this field so susceptible to cartelization that 
this threat outweighs this arrangement's administrative econo-
mies. 
( ( 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
November 23, 1981 
Re: No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society, et al. 
Dear Chie·f: 
I agree with your suggested order • 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
T.M. 
.... 
.§u:punu QJ:o-ttrl cf f:qt 'J!lnittb .§brlt~ 
'Jlfag4htgfctt, ~. QI. 20p.l!, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
November 23, 1981 
Re: 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Dear Chief: 
If there is a Court for the disposition you 
propose, I will be writing in dissent. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVEN!;i 
.§npumt <!fttttrl cf tJ:rt 'J!initt~ ~btltAl' 
~ag4ingfon. !l. <!f. 20.;r.Jt~ 
November 23, 1981 
Re: 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Dear Chief: 
If there is a Court for the disposition you 
propose, I will be writing in dissent. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
November 24, 1981 
80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Dear ChiPf: 
Possibly my notes are jn error, but they s how that 
the only firm voteq for a DIG in this case were yours and 
~hurgood's. As oresently Advised, I continue to think that 
a DIG is inappropriate. 
My notes indicate that ,'Tohn and Bi 11 ~renn n would 
reverse, and hold that there was a cons~iracy by competing 
doctors to fix prices. 
I unoerstooa that Byron would remand without 
deciding whether there has been a per se violation or 
whether the rule of reason is applicable. As Byron put it, 
we need a more adequate record before deciding this case on 
:I.ts merits. Both Bill Rehnquist and I expressed vi.ews 
generally similar to those of Byron. 
As we have only a seven member Court, there would 
be no Court opinion, unless you revert to your alternative 
vote which - as recorded in my notes - was to remand. You 
stated that summary judgment had been granted prematurely, 
and that the record before us is inadequate, a view that 
appears to be similar to that of Byron, Bill Rehnquist and 
mine. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS or 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.§u:µuntt QJnttri of tltt ~th .§taft.S' 
~Ifingfon, ~- C!J. 20ffe)l.~ 
November 24, 1981 
80-419 - ARIZONA v. MARICOPA COUNTY 
MEDICAL SOCIETY, ET AL. 
Dear Chief, 
I would not DIG. Lewis accurately 
stated my position. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtutt C!Jl!Url 4tf tlrt ~tb .Statts 
jiru4htghnt. ~- C!J. 20p'!~ 
November 24, 1981 
Re: No. 80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Dear Chief: 
I find my notes corresponding very much with those 
which Lewis sets forth in his note to you of November 24th, 
and although I would be quite willing to dismiss the case 
as improvidently granted, I don't think that there are 
four of the seven participating Jus t;.,l.-'ees-.Wflre-~~~ -&~.:t..ll 
result. I would be happy to join short one-paragraph 
Per Curiam stating that the action o · t our 
Iileither granting or denying a motion for partial summary 
judgment as to the applicability of the "per se" rule at 
the stage of the case it was made was premature, and remand 
the case for developments of a further record. 
Sincerely,~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
j\nprmtt <!Jourt of t!f t '1titth ,itatts 
~asltinghtn. J. <!J. 2llffe~-' 
l November 27, 1981 
V 
Re: No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society 
Dear Lewis: 
I suggest you undertake to draft a dispositive 
Per Curiarn on this case. 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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Maximum Price Fixing 
Frank H. Easterbrookt 
If all of the grocers in a city agreed to sell 100-watt light bulbs 
for no more than fifty cents, that would be maximum pric~· fixing. 
If a group of optometrists agreed to charge no more than $30 for 
an eye examination and to display a distinctive symbol on the 
shop3 of parties to the agreement, that would be maximum price 
fixi;.1g. And if most of the physicians in a city, acting through a 
nonprofit association, offered to treat patients for no more than a 
given price if insurance companies would agree to pay the fee, that 
agreement would bs maximum price fixing too. 
A maximum price a~pears to be a boon for consumers. The 
optometris:s' symbol, for exampl?., helps consumers find iow-cost 
·1ppliers of the service. But foe 2.greement also appears to run 
j.'oul of the rule agai!lst p:ice fixing, under which "a combination 
- formed for the purpose ::,r}d with t!-!e effect of raising, depressing, 
fixing, pegging, or stabilizi!lg the price of a commodity ... is ille-
gal per se."1 
This rule might be read as banning only those price agree-
ments that reduce the allocative efficiency of the economy: monop-
olistic price increa:;es and monopsonistic price decreases. In eithel' 
of these cases, a price agreemtnt drives a wedge between the com-
petitive price and the market price_kto the detriment of efficiency. ¢-1 
On the other ha.nd, if a maximum price agreement serves only to 
supply information to consumers about where bargains can be had, 
or to overcome conditions that have elevated price above marginal 
cost, the objections to monopoly and monopsony do not apply. 
The Supreme Court has been of two minds about arguments 
of this sort. On the one hand, it has said that the benefits of price 
agreements are irrelevant. "Whatever economic justification partic-
ular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does 
T }'rofessor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank Douglas G. Baird, Dennis W. Carl-
t c•11, l<:1,nneth W. Dain, Wiiliam M. Landes, Phil C. Nenl, B. Peter Pasliigian, Richard A 
P0,nfr, Stt!phen M, Shapiro, and George J. Stigler for their helpful comments on on earlier 
clrnft. 





... , l, 
• ' ' _,_... _ _ .,_T--•··--• 
,,-
o .-l_.,y 24-Jun-81 01:40 STYLE: SV:(STVLES)CH!.8StCl,l) FILE: SV:(DARBV2l8b702(70,22) SEQ: 2 
'--
2 The University of Chicago Law Review (31:1 
not permit an inquiry into reasonableness. They are all banned be-
cause of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous sys-
tem of the economy."2 It has applied this rationale to hold maxi-
mum price agreements unlawful in Kiefer-Stewart Co. u. Joseph 
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 3 and Albrecht v. Herald Co. 4 At the same 
time, the Court regularly sustains business ventures that engage in 
price fixing far more successfully than any cartel. Mergers, joint 
ventures, partnerships, and similar organizations suppres~· price 
competition internally to organize production through other 
means. These arrangements could be banned as price fixing, but 
they are not. To call something "price fixing" therefore does not 
assist in analysis; "price fixing" is no more than a label given to 
arrangements that have been found unlawful per se.6 It is neces-
sary to examine a given arrangement's probable effects before at-
taching this fatal label. The Court has been willing in recent years 
to conduct such examinations to determine which arrangements 
are most beneficial to consumers.6 I argue in this article that maxi-
mum price fixing is almost always beneficial to consumers, and the 
+ime has come to abandon any per se rule against the practice. 
I. KIEFER-STEWART A~D ALBRECHT ., 
The examples of maximum price fixing given in the fi st para-
graph of this article involved cooperation among compet· ors._Both 
o the Court's decisions on maximum price fixing, oweve~ -
volved ver 1 :a:I restnc1ions: ,r~ ale price maintena . In Kiefer-
Stewar~ two affiliated liquor distillerT1ns1sted that their wholesale 
customers reduce the price at which liquor was furnished to retail-
ers, In Albr,ech~ a newspaper insisted that its distributor reduce 
the price charged to subscribers. The distillers and the newspaper 
were buying distribution services, and the cost of distribution was 
the difference between the initial price and the "fixed" resale price. 
2 Id. at 226 n.59. See also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647-48 
(1980). 
3 340 U.S. 211 (1951). 
4 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
5 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). 
6 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (~ legislative history of the Sher- .-.S--
man Act "suggest[s] that Congress designed [it] ... as ol consumer welfare prescription'") V:. 
(quoting R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9, 19-20 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs · 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania( Inc., ~ 
433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 
(1977). 
.. ~· .. 
- ~ .· , . 
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It is possible to see both cases as monopsony problems, with the 
seller attempting to monopsonize distribution; it is possible, too, to 
interpret the cases as boycotts, subject to scrutiny accordingly.7 
Horizontal maximum price fixing does not involve either of these 
problems. i 
It is unnecessary, however, to hunt for strained distinctions to 
argue that Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht should not be controlling 
in maximum price fixing cases. Both cases invoked rationales that 
have since been repudiated by the Court. Kiefer-Stewart disposed 
of the antitrust arguments laconically, stating that maximum price 
agreements, "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the 
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in ac-
cordance with their own judgment."8 Albrecht repeated this 
theme.9 But the "freedom of tradersf has nothing to do with con- ~ 
sumers' welfare. The emphasis on 'freedom of traders" in these 
cases recalls the remark of the Court in the Schwinn case that re-
stricted distribution practices limit "the retailer's freedom as to 
where a...11d to whom it will resell the products"10 and so "violate 
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation."11 The Supreme 
Court has overruled Schwinn and explicitly rejected any analysis 
that makes antitrust cases turn on the "autonomy of independent 
businessmen."u Arguments about the effect of a practice on quan-
tity and price, not arguments about freedom and autonomyt con-
trol antitrust analysis. 
Kiefer-Stewart contains no arguments about price or quantity. 
Albrecht does. The,( Court asserted that maximum price agree- © Alb'l".ec.1-lt 
ments substitute "the perhaps erroneous judgment of the seller for 
/ · the forces of the competitive market" and thus reduce "the ability 
of buyers to compete and survive in that market.,,13 This is really 
7 Although such interpretations are possible, they are not plausible. The sellers have no 
incentive to monopsonize distribution, for that just dries up the supply of distributors and 
preventa the seller from disseminating its product. Moreover, the characterization of the 
acts as "boycotts" does not help us to decide whether the maximum price fixing is deairable. 
8 340 U.S. at 213. 
9 390 U.S. at 1.52. 
10 United Stati,s v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378 (1977). 
11 Id. nt 380. ~ . 
12 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvanial Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (Hl77). Justice 
White, the author of Albrecht, objected to this aspect of the GTE Sylvania decision, calling 
it inconsistent with Albrecht. Id. at 66-70 (White, J., concurring). 
13 390 U.S. at 152. See also id. at 153 ("[m]aximuro price fixing may channel distribu-
tion through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers"-epparently describing dealers 
who can distribute the product at lower coat). 
.. 
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two arguments. First, it asserts that sellers 111ay err in establishing 
a price. This is irrelevant to antitrust policy; a single firm also may 
err in setting its own price, but this has never been thought to call 
for condemnation, even when the error-prone firm is a monopolist. 
Because the market penalizes errors, firms eventually will correct 
their mistakes or suffer ~sequences. The second argument, 
concerns the effect on buyers and reflects solicitude for competi-
tors, as distinct from competition. This approach is no more help-
ful in evaluating the practice than is solicitude for the freedom of 
traders.,. The only argument in Albrecht that concerns competi-
tion is the assertion that the maximum price will soon become the 
minimum price, and then the arrangement will acquire the defects 
of a cartel.15 Perhaps so; I consider this possibility in Part III-A. 
But the Albrecht opinion simply asserts the conclusion. It provides 
no a:gument that this is likely or, if likely, undesirable. 
The s:1allo..,.-:ness of the reasoning in Albrecht suggests that its 
rule sh.oulci be examined more closely. The Court has emphasized 
in recent years that per se rules should be employed only after 
thorough study and considerable experience have led to a conclu-
sion that almost every instance of the practice sought to be con-
demned is harmful, so that there is no point in attempting to sepa-
rate the harmful insta..rices from the harmless or beneficial ones in 
case after case.16 Per se rules are uaed, in other words, 1.o hold as 
low as possible the sum of the welfare losses from the practice and 
the costs of litigating about it.17 There is no reasorr to have a per se 
14 See Bruns.,..ick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (the 
Sherman Act protect3 "competition, not competitors") (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
15 390 U.S. et 152. 
16 See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (per se rule 
applies if "a particular concerted activity entails an obviou~ risk of anticompetitive impact 
with no apparent potentially redeeming value"); Broadcast Music, lnc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10, 19 & n.33, 22 n.40 (1979) (emphasizing need for "consid-
t-he 
erable" experience with a practice before per se con<lemnatiorft' and remnrking on role of ~ 
output reduction as trigger for a per se rule); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1978) (the per se rule appli<,s only to agreements "whose na-
ture and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive th!'tt no elaborate study of the indus-
try is needed"); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvaniao/ Tnc., 433 U.S. 36, f,O n.16 (1977) (in --0--
establishing per se rules, "[t]he probability that antic.ompetitive consequence~ will result 
from a practice and the severity of those consequences musl. be balanced against its procom-
petitive consequences .... [A] per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not 
a~ffici htly common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify 
the .") 
17 See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Co1interstrategies, 48 U. Ctn. L. REV. 
263, 333-37 (1981); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitru.st Treatment of Restricted Distri-
·,, , ·. ' .•· 
:· • ....... 
. ,' l 
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rule unless the Court is confident that "the effect and, . . . because 
it tends to show effect, . . . the purpose of the practice are to 
threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market 
economy-that is, [that] the practice facially appears to be one 
that would always o~ almost always tend to restrict competition 
and decrease output, ... or instead one designed toCJ{ncrease eco-~ '& 'O. 
nomic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, com-
petitive.' "18 
The Court has ) ever attempted to determine whether maxi- h -:. 
mum price fixing would almost always "tend to restrict competi-
tion and decrease output" or "increase economic efficiency" in-
stead. Just as Schwinn was not the last word on restricted 
. ..... ·- ·. . ... 
• . : , ~· : • • :.: i •• ;· \ 
. <-...-.:• .. . 
' . 
'. ,;': .. '-:~ :~-·: 
~: • ::,• -'. I_.; •,,; 
.•· :''.• . ',. ·. : ... , . 
distribution practices, so Albrecht cannot be the last word on max- 1 / 
imum price fixing.10 h a,d~ ~o explore the *'1- of maximum® .))-1 Cnf' , vses 
price fixing, I concentrate in this al'ticle on agreements among · 
competitors, disregarding vertical restricted distribution arrange-
ments. If such horizontal agreements have benefits that make ap-
plication of a per se rule inappropriate, restricted distribution 
cases can be disposed of without further ado.20 
IL FUNCTIONS OP MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING 
A. Introduction 
In perfect competition firms sell at marginal cost-as low as 
bution· Per Se Legality, 48. U. CH1. L. REv. 6, 22-26 (1981). 
18 BroP.dcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadca~ting Sy11., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) 
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)}. 
19 The Court bas hinted that Albrecht is open for reexamination. See Group Life & 
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 & n.5 (1979) (reserving judgment on 
the legality of an agreement to set maximum prices). 
20 Maximum resale price fixing has none of the potential anticompetitive consequences 
of horizontal maximum price .fixing (see Part III, infra), and so the vertical case can be 
resolved more easily. Moreover, maximum resale price fixing has a competitive benefit that 
does not occur in cases of horizontal maximum price fixing: the maximum resale price pre-
vents distributors from e:xploiting territories given to them by manufacturers. Distributors 
with exclusive territories may attempt to set monopoly prices; maximum resale price main-
tenance prevents this. Because it iH lawful to grant exclusive territories, it also should be 
lawful to place on the grant such conditions as are reasonably likely to aid consumers. These 
an<! other argument.3 about maximum resale pr:ce fodng have been mode cogently_eJsewhere, 
and there is little point in repeating the an11lysis here. See Albrecht v. Herald Cf Co., 390 
U.S. 145, 165-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 168-70 (Stewart, J ., dissenting) (1968); 3 P. AREF:DA 
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 734e (1978); R. BORK, supra note G, at 435-39 ~ R. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11i8 (1976). See also Eastern Scientific 
Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d SSJ (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 
(1978), for a convincing argument that resale price fi~ng is not unlawful, even under Al-
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the most efficient method of production will allow. An agreement 
to charge a maximum price lower than marginal cost would cause a 
reduction in allocative efficiency. Such a possibility is of little legal 
interest, however, because firms usually can be counted on to pro-
tect their own interests. If price falls below marginal cost, they can 
make more money by increasing price. An agreement calling for 
sales at less than marginal cost consequently would be unstable. 
Firms would raise prices as soon as they discovered the error. 
There is no reason for antitrust law to penalize blunders of this 
sort; the firms bear as private losses any damage done by their 
prices, and blunders thus are self-deterring.z1 
A mEimum price agreement ~g_~ a conspiracy to charge a 
predatory price, but here too there is no reason for concern. Preda-
tion does not work unless the predator, having driven rivals from 
the market, can raise its price and recoup its investment in preda-
tion through monopoly overcharges. A "conspiracy to predate" 
through maximum prices would be absurd. Even if the 
predetors--the firms subscribing to the maximum price agree-
ment-could drive rivals from the market, they could not recoup 
their investment. The participants in the price reduction agree-
ment would begin to compete against one another once price rose. 
Only a minimum price fixing agreement; a cartel, would make re--
coupment possible. But such a cartel could be detected and prose-
cuted under standard antitrust rules, and the damages award 
would prevent the conspirators from recouping. There is no reason 
to proceed against a maximum price agreement that has not pro-
duced-and probably never could produce-a recoupment cartel.?.2 
There are thus only two cases about which we must be con-
cerned. It is possible ifi'af the maximum pnce agreement is a dis-
guise for a more traditional cartel, in which event the agreement 
should be held unlawful. It is also possible that without the agree-
ment, price would exceed marginal cost; ~the maximum price 
agreement ~drives price back toward marginal cost or, perhaps, 
reduces marginal cost. If a maximum price agreement has either 
effect, we *ould count ourselves fortunate; condemnation is out of 
the question. But at least at first glance, it is hard to see why sell-
ers who can obtain a price exceeding marginal cost would agree to 
21 See Easterbrook, supra note , nt 278-81, for a more complete expl1111ation of why 
prices et less than marginal cost nre self-deterring. 
22 See id. at 331-33 for an argument that only a person who pays the overcharge should 
be permitted to bring a predatory prich,g suit. 
~ .. -
~..: ·· ~··:,-. . .- ~ · ... -· 
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charge less, or how sellers can reduce their costs by acting collec- · 
tively. If sellers have no plausible-that is, profitable-reason for 
reducing their prices, we may infer that any given maximum price 
agreement is actually a traditional cartel in disguise. To under-
stand the function of a maximum price agreementr then, we must 
ask how firms can profit by reducing price. : 
B. Searching for Low-Price Sellers 
One important discovery of the economics of information is 
that the cost of searching for low-price sellers affects the price sell-
ers will charge.23 The more costly the search, the more likely it is 
that any given seller will be able to set a price exceeding marginal 
cost. Whe'I.. a. buyer does not know what price each seller charges, -.=. I'\ 
he must go from seller to seller seeking information. Every visit 
entails a cost: the searcher's own time is valuable, transportation is 
costly, and delay in making the purchase also may be costly. Sell-
ers can take advantage of this. If, for example, the marginal cost of 
a widget is SlOO, a..11d a prospective searcher incurs a cost of $5 to 
learn the price at any store, the merchant can set a price of at least 
$105 for his widget, if he knows consumers' search costs. Even if 
the consumer knows that widgets are available somewhere for 
$100, he would pay $105 if that were the price at the first store he 
visited. If he refused the offer, he would incur a cost of $5 to make 
another check and even then might not get a qu€>te of $100. If 
every seller is charging $105, none has an incentive to reduce the 
price to $100, because the reduction would not generate additional 
business. (Every buyer . visits only one store.) If search costs fall, 
h"wever, so does the price. 
Not all buyers have the same search costs. Those with lower 
costs will look at more than one price. These searchers enable some 
merchants to increase their volume by reducing prices; low-cost 
searchers might keep trying until they found widgets for $102, and 
stores that reduced price to this level might experience an increase 
in sales that more than offsetl the lower per sale profit. In a sense, cs 
these low-cost shoppers protect the high-cost shoppers. If substan-
tial numbers of people do not do much searching, however, many 
sellers will find it advantageous to set a price above marginal 
c:ost.2 • 
23 Schwartz & Wilde, lnteruening in Markets on the Basis of. Imperfect Information: 
A l ,egal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979), sumnrnrizes much of the 
ero1 ,,.,1oic literature. 
24 This principle was exploited by the defendant.; in National Soc'y of Professional 
.. :.. -_..: .,, , : 
. -:·. "·'f.· ' 
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Advertisements are one way low-price selleni can identify 
themselves. The Supreme Court has recognized whai studies. show: 
advertising leads to lower prices by reducing the cost of finding 
low-price sellers,211 Advertisements are less effective in reducing 
price, however, if buyers are uncertain about the quality of the 
product (the advertised price might represen1, just an inferior sam-
ple) and if the seller who advertises canncit. expand his output 
(much) at the low price. In the latter case the advertising sellers 
will not draw much business from the quiet sellers, who can con-
tinue to charge a price exceeding marginal cost. Moreover, if a 
third party and not the searcher pays for the product, price adver-
tising may be pointless. The rational comumer, assured of third-
party payment, will ignore the advertisements and go to the seller 
who offers the highest quality, or perhaps simply to the first seller. 
We th£:refore would expect significant price dispersion and many 
sales at prices exc~ding marginal cost \vhenever search is costly or 
infrequent, quality uncertain, and the consumer does not pay for 
the purchase. 2 ~ 
A maxir;:n.1.!TI price egreement can help to 1educe search costs. 
Sellers \0.:ould find the milimum price useful for the same reason 
they find advertisi1;.g useful. Those adhering io the agreement are 
identified as low-price sellers, and this identification should lead to 
an increase in the sales by those so identified. Maximum (list) 
& ~ eept. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The society adopted a rule prohibiting 
competitive bids. Purchasers oi engineering~ onsequently h11d to go from engineer to engi-
neer, seeking a price from each one in sequence. Because each engineer might take weeks or 
months to exar;:iine the specifications and submit a price, the c:ost of each search W9.S high. 
The society admitted, and the Court assumed, that this st.rategy raised prices. Justice 
-Blackmu~ explicitly observed that the costs of searching were _ the cau~e of the higher 
prices. Id. at 700 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
25 Bates v_ State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977). See cdso Benham & Ben-
ham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspectiue on. Information Control, 18 J. L. 
& EcoN. 421 {1975); Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J_ L. 
& EcoN. 337 (1972); J. Kwoka, Advertising, Quality, and Price: A Model nnd Evidenc--e from 
Professional Services (Feb. 19, 1981) (paper presented at the Jnduslrial Org11nization Work-
shop, University of Chicago) (on file with The University of Chicago Lnw -ll{d>. While ad-
vertising sometimes may lead to price increases when it serves ns a signal of consistent qual-
ity, the consumer in this case places on the signal a value greater than thE: price increase. 
See R. POSNER & F_ EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 511-16 (2d ed. 1981 ). 
26 See Salop & Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs, 44 REV. ECON. Snm. 493 (1977). See also 
Newhouse & Sloan, Physician Pricing.- Monopolistic or Competitive: Reply, 38 S. EcoN. J. 
577 (1972) (finding substantial price variance in market for physicians' services, n market 
~ by quality uncertainty, lack of advertising, nnd third-p11rly paymenl). See also Hey 
& MclCenna, Consumer Search with Uncertain Product ~a/ity, 89 J_ Pm .. Eco:-<. 54 ( 1981 ); 
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 
1 
, at 650-51, 662-63, 672-73. 
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prices are used this way by many manufacturers and dealers. This 
benefit is sufficiently plain that even the Antitrust Division of the 
Justice Department has pointed to it as a justification for a maxi--' 
mum price agreement.:n 
These principles a.re quite abstract, so it ~ _b_e_ h~lpfu_!~p 4 
pl~m to an exis!!.._I1g__maximum price agreement. The Maricopa 
FoundationforMedical ~anonprofitassociation that acts as 
egent for both physicians and insurance companies. Any physician 
i~ aricopa Countymay join; approximately seventy percent have 
done so. The foundation proposes maximum 'prices for medical ser-
vices. In exchange for the insurers' agreement to pay the price for 
services, the member physicians undertake not to seek any addi-
tional payment from the patients. In Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society,28 the Ninth Circuit held that this arrangement is 
not unlawful per se as price fixing. 
~ 
Medical services are a textbook example of goods in which J 
quality is tL.'1certain, search costs are high (patients sometimes can-
not search at all), purchases are infrequent, and third-party pay-
ments reduce the incentive for patients t.o search even when they 
can do so at low cost. A maximum price agreement may identify 
low-price sellers to the insurance companies, which may instruct 
the insureds to use a member of the foundation for medical care. 
Insurers participating in the plan will have lower costs, and the 
insureds wili pay lower premiums. Physicians willing to accept the 
established maximum may join the foundation; others will not do 
so. The process should lead to a reductio_!l in the cost of servic~ 
satisfyingthe criteria set out in the introdu~he 
article: the maximum price agreement makes both consumers and 
the participating sellers ~etter off. I consider in Part III whether 
there is a more sinister explanation for medical foundations of this 
.27 Brief for the United Statet< as Amicus Curiae at 10-14, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. 
v. Royal Drug Co., ~40 U.S. 205 (1979).-Set irl. at 11 -~ (A maximum price agreement 
"help!s] the policyholders find low-overhead pharmacies with which to deal. Moreover, it 
provides pharmacies with incentives to reduce their distribution costs in order to be able to 
take advantage of [the maximum price] and still make a profit.' . Grau Li e involve 
maximum price schedule announced by ~-~ of services; in Part III-A, I consider 
whether sellers' agreements should be treated differently. 
28 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1 981). The stated facts 
appear in the opinion with one exception: the seventy percent membership estimate is in 
the appellate record at 7(a) ~ 106. ~ 
I 
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sort.29 
C. Reducing Transactions Costs : 
In some markets the costs of striking an agreement may be 
very high in relation to the value of the good. The market in musi-
cal performing rights is an example. Radio and television stations 
play thousands of copyrighted songs and jingles daily, sometimes 
not deciding what to play until moments before airtime. The mar-
ket would break down if a license had to be negotiated for each 
use. The costs of negotiation would be substantial, the costs of de-
lay or advance planning large, and the costs of composers' listening 
to every program to ensure that no unlicensed music was used in-
calculable. Composers therefore have formed performing rights so-
cieties, which grant "blanket" licenses to users of music. The blan-
ket licenses are price fixing in a technical sense-the competing 
copyright holders ag:;:-ee on a price for the licEmse and divide the 
proceeds-but the agreement unquestional>1y increases allocative 
efficiency. The societies cannot charge more for the license than 
the licecsa 2~11d t:ansactions costs that would be incurred by the 
users if they obtained individual licenses. The users' preference for 
~blanket liceme~establishes that they are beneficial, and the Su- "?r- / ~s 
preme Court has held that they are not unlawful per se despite the 
existe:ice of price fixing. 30 
29 Kall5trom, Health Ccre Cos: Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and 
the Sherman Act, 1978 DuKZ L.J. 645, 678-84; Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of Prepaid Legal 
Services Plans, 1976 Al.!. BAR FousDATlON RESEARCH LT. 855, 882-84; and Note, Antitrust 
and Nonprofi t Entities, 94 HARV. L_ REY. 802, 811-16 (1981), take somewhat different views 
of the functions of profesaional care foundations. Kallstrom nrgues that maximum price 
fixing by ph~icians should be unla .. iul because it creates too much risk of cartelization; he 
recommends that maximum prices be permitted only if insurance companies promulgate the 
5Chedules. I consider this ar ent in Part III-A. Meeks, on the other hand, sees maximum 
pdce fixing e.s el truism by attorney ; he believes that it is beneficial because the attorneys T fl.. 
-will furnish serv1ces for less than the competitive rate. This is implausible; there is no need 
to rely on supposed altruism to understand why ma.'timum prices_benefit consumers. The 
Harvard Note apparently would find maximum price schedules unlawful but for the non-
profit status of the foundations; given the nonprofit statu8, the student author maintains, 
the foundations should be allowed to set maximum fees if t.hat. will overcome some market 
failure. There is, however, no reason why tli a R~,Q~ status of the foundations should -r'-';S 
have any effect on antitrust analysis. Trade associations and joint ventures often are non-
profit associations, yet their activities have been scrutinized under the usual antitrust stan-
dards. And it would be inappropriate to call search costs "market failures." They nre simply 
costs, much as medical education is a cost. That sellers can find a way to reduce these costs 
does not imply that a "failure" has been "overcome." See Demsetz, Information nnd Effi-
ciency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1969). 
30 Broadcast Mu3ic, Inc. v. Columbitt Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. J (1979). The 
Court pointed out that rather than acting as a "naked restraint," the blanket license re-
· · , \ .. 
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Performing rights licenses are an extreme case, but the princi- ( 
ple is perfectly general. C~ative behavior often reduces costs. 
The cooperation in a legal partnership or a corporation is an exam-
ple. Maximum price agreements may be another. In the example of 
the optometrists given at the beginning of this article, the maxi-
mum price agreement served as a basis for price advertising 
(through the distinctive symbol), and such advertising may be less 
costly and more effective than advertisements placed by many in-
dividual optometrists. . _ 
The same can be said of the ~ axirnum rice a reement in 
Mar~ _) ons1 er e cos o reac mg pnce agreE:ments in every 
"c~ Consumers must take on faith much of what their physicians 
tell them, and it is often hard for physicians even io describe their 
product. Pa2 ents would have to educate themselves to a considera-
ble deg;:ee to k.i."low what tney should Se willing to pay forl given 
service. T he physicia..:.-i, as well as the consumer, may be ignorant of 
the relevant cos ts and benefits of service. Young physicians in par-
ticular would r.ot know appropriate charges.5 1 They could, of 
course, pick prices arbitrarily and see how many patients refused 
treatment; pe.tie:1t.s b turn could attempt to learn something about 
medicine s1d seek quotes from several physicians. But the costs of 
such a trial- a..'1d-error process would be high. 
There is, moreover, a need for emergency service. Patients 
may be unconscious or in no position to negotiate. Or after~-
ment begins, 1t may become C ear that t e case is more compli-
cated thsn the parties first supposed. If the physician first renders 
service and then attempts to name a price, the parties are locked 
into a bilateral monopoly; the physician ,x..·ill name a high price and 
the patient a low one, and because the service has been performed, 
neither has much incentive to compromise. ~ the law of resti-
tution supplies an off-the-shelf answer to this impasse, it may be 
duced the costs of transacting licenses and monitoring performers. Id. at 20-22. On remand, 
the court of appeals applied the Rule of Reason and found the blanket license lawful. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Sec'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 
F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1491 (1981). See also K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin 
Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 10-15 (1968) (sustoining 
blanket li cense). 
31 ~ Eisenberg, Information Exchange Among Competitors: The Issue of Relative 
Va lue Scales for Physicians' Services, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 441 (1980), for o description of the 
pn ,blems in setting prices for medical services. The costa of price-set.ting by individual phy-
11icians are especially high if, ns sometimes occurs, the physicions attempt to size up their 
patients and charge more to the wealthier. See Kessel, Price Discriminntion in Medicine, 1 
J .L. & EcoN. 20 (1958). 
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quite costly to apply the legal principles. A price schedule that al-
lows instantaneous service is one of the benefits of performing 
rights societies, and this holds for maximum price fixing as well. 
W1!._en third parties such insurance companies P!!Y for_ the 
service, the~ ransacUons costs of reaching a price agreement be-
;:-especially high. The insured person has no reason to ;eek 
lo~rice suppliers. Instead, he will seek the highest quality sup-
plier for which the insurer will pay.82 The insurer must attempt to 
police price agreements between patient and physician. It may 
limit fees to customary charges for average-quality providers, in-
vestigate bills to determine whether the service was warranted, and 
so forth. But these measures are costly and apt to be ineffective.53 
Once the service has been performed, the professional (whether 
physicia11 or auto-body rebuilder) has control of the relevant infor-
mation 2.nd can plausibly insist that the service was necessary and 
the fo-:: justified by the complexity of the task. The adoption of a 
maximum fee schedule reduces these costs of supervision. The in-
surer can offer io~:er rates, and the providers can save the hours 
they 'l!sed to spend filling out forms justifyfog the service and fees. 
'J'he fees ea.med duri:ig these released hours ee~ily could compen-
sate for the lower fee per treatment, making the maximum price 
schedule profitable to all parties. 
It might seem that the cost reductions come from the exis-
tence of any fee schedule and are not specific to maximum price 
fixing by suppliers. Insurance compa...-1ies would be an alternate 
source of price schedules. Insurers, however, do not necessarily 
32 Even the process_pf searching for high quality sellers may be inefficient. The devel-
oping economics of signalling suggests that sellers attempt to send ''signals" about the quali-
ty of their wares, and that the signalling is wasteful because it is offset by other resources. 
See, e.g .. Hirshfleifer & Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Exposi-
tory Suruey, 17 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1375, 1389;.l)_I (1979) (collecting sources). Markets 
often develop methods to suppress wasteful signainng nnd inefficient sorting. See Barze!, 
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 291, 301 -05 
(1977). Maximum price agreements may serve such n function . Suppliers who cannot send 
signals that identify their quality at I~ cost would join the maximum price group, which 
can reduce its price by the Sflved signalling costs; suppliers who Cflll identify their quality at 
lower cost will stay out of the group and sell n distinctive product r.t n different price. 
33 Auger [,. Goldberg, Prepaid Health Plans and Moral Hazard, 22 Pua. PoL'v 353 
(1974), describes the costs of systems that attempt. t.o set price nfter the service has been 
tendered. See also Posner, Regulatory Aspects of Notional Health lnsurarice Plans, 39 U. 
Cm. L. REV. 1 (1971); Spence & Zeckhauser, Jnsurnnce, Jnfarmation, and lndiuidtwl Ac-
tion, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 380 (1971); Zecklurnser, Medical lrisurance: A Case Study of the 
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have as much information as suppliers' groups about the relative 
costs and difficulties of particular services. Schedules promulgated 
by the insurers therefore are less likely to clear the market. More-
over, maximum price schedules adopted by associations of provid-
ers require fewer total transactions. Once the association adopts a 
maximum price schedule, each provider and each insurer must 
make a single decisioni whether to participate in the program. A ~(D 
~ 
single identifier (for example, "M~mber of the 1\j,!lLicopa Founcta--
ti~ Care") can inform the insureds under many }211:!,ns 
whether the provider has agreed to accept fhe insurer's payment.in 
sat1s ac ion o e ee. f eac msurer must promulgate its own 
sche u e, owever, ev ry provider must accept. or decline the offer 
from every insurer; the number of transactions equals the number 
of sellers times the number of insurance plans. 34 
The costs of buyer-proposed schedules could be less than the 
costs under seller-proposed schedules. When that. is so, we would 
observe buyers proposing their schedules and attracting business. 
That occurred in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal 
Drug Co.,53 where Blue Shield proposed a price schedule for pre-
scription drugs and enrolled all pharmacies that would dispense 
drugs for cost plt!s a foe of $2. Insurance companies have proposed 
schedules for auto body repair as well. But when seJlers propose a 
maximum p:ice sch~dule and buyers do not make a counteroffer, it 
is fair to conclude that tra..YJ.sactions costs are lower under the sell-
ers' schedule. These savings are quite similar to th~ cost reductions 
that led the Supreme Court to conclude in Broadcast ~Music that 
· performing rights societies are not unlawful per se despite the 
composers' plain agreement on price. 
. -------
D. Creating @._ "New Product" . 
· Price reductions-assoe: ed with lower search and transactions 
costs may well accompany any ma.ximum price agreement. Only 
.the magnitude of these effects will vary from product to product. 
Additional savings may be available under unusual circumstances. 
In dealing with the price agreements underlying performing 
rights societies, the Court observed that the blanket license was a 
distinctive product: it allowed users both great flexibility in choos-
34 The number of transaction~ could be reduced if the insurers coopernted in proposing 
fee schedules. That, however, would substitut~ buyers' cooperation for sellers'. There is no 
reason to prefer potential monopsony (buyers' cooperation) to pot.enti11l monopoly (Rellers' 
cooperation). 
35 440 U.S. 205 (1979). 
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ing compositions and the ability to play compositions without de- ( 
lay.36 This recognition that the blanket license offered a new prod-
uct, one not available without cooperation among copyright 
holders, was an element in the Court's conclusion that the blanket 
license was not unlawful as price fixing. 37 
A maximum price agreement, like the blanket license, changes 
the identity of the "product" in at least some cases. The Maricopa 
case again provides an example. When consu'mers purchase he~lth 
insurance, they obtain protection against at least two kinds of un-
certain~ : whether they will need medical assistance and the cost 
of the assistance. Some cases will be more difficult than others. 
The insurance company usually assumes both risks, but. this may 
not always be desirable. If the insurer will pay for any treatment, 
however costly, physicians have an incentive t.o provide unwar-
ranted service. The lack of price discipline creates a mora1 hazard 
and leads to excessive costs.38 
The _moral hazar_d can be reduced if the physician insures art 
of the uncertainty. If thephysician's fee for escn e courses of 
treatment is fixed, he loses any incentive to provide unwarranted 
Gfil_e.... \Vhen thetreat.:::1ent turns out to be more simple than antici-
pated, the fixed fee overcompensates the physician for hjs time; 
when the case is unusual or complications develop, t.he maximum 
t'° fee underco:::npensates the physician. Spreading t:he risk in this 
fashion over ~.mci1eds ta-.thousands of cases is the usual definition 
of insurance.39 Without a maximum price, however, this method of 
~~ ~ insurance by physicians -even if desirable 
~
1 
, .t _ because: it reduces costs-would not work as well. An individual 
. j /~ physician who announced a maximum price would find patients 
llV U a._ith more complex cases more likely to come to him. Patients with ~r 
36 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1979). 
37 Whether it should have been an important element in the decision is open to ques-
tion. A "new product" is desirable only to the extent it reduces the costs of producing a 
service-in Broadcast Music, completed,ltelevision programs. The rost.s of broadcasting 
could be reduced in many ways: whether the reduction involves a "new product" is irrele-
vant. Indeed, economists usually leave the identification of a "product" to popular conven-
tion, for its definition is simply arbitrary. A "product" is whatever bundle of at.tributes can 
be lumped· cunve!liently to ether under a single price and a Ringle name. 
38 See note , supra. 
39 See, e.g., Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Core, 53 AM. 
EcoN. RRv. 941, 962 (1963). The Court employed a similar definition in Group Life & Health 
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211-15 (1979). The dissenters pointed out that risk-
sp!eading through providers is insurance in the economic sense. Id. at 251 (Brennan, ,J., 
dissentin6). 
• ,w- ... ~ -
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simple cases would go to physicians who charged by the hour 
rather than by the treatment. In the end, the physician would be 
compelled to raise his fixed price until it equaled the expected fee 
for the most complex treatments, and the benefits of insurance-by-
providers would be lost.'0 A maximum price agreement among a 
substantial number of providers overcomes this sifting mechanism 
and preserves the benefits of this insurance device. 
III. ANTICOMPETITIVE EXPLANATIONS OF MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING 
I have discussed three ways in which maximum price fixing 
could benefit both producers and consumers. These benefits do not 
always accompany every maximum price, because a maximum 
price agreement might simply be a euphemism for a cartel price. In 
the following sections, I discuss some of the less pleasant charac-
terizations of maxi:;:::;J.ll!n price fixing and how beneficial agreements 
may ba distinguished from others. 
A. Ce.riels 
One way to e.rgue that maximum price agreements are like 
c·u-tels is to say that the maximum price will become the minimum 
price. lf the ceiling is a floor, the argument runs, there is no differ-
ence between the two. ·he Supreme Court in Albrecht•1 and the 
dissenting juc.ge i.n faric pa :i made arguments of this sort. 
The analogy i3 not e p ul. Although it is true that if the seller 
discovers that consumers will pay the maximum price, he will 
charge that price, this tells us little of interest. The seller will 
charge what the traffic v.,ill bear whether or not he participates in 
an agreement.•s The pertinent question is whether the agreement 
enables the seller to charge more than he could obtain without the 
agreement. The argument that the maximum· price becomes the 
40 The way in which sifting can lead to the collapse of markets is studied in Ackerlof, 
7'he Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Marhet Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 
488 (1970); Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitiue Insurance Markets: An Es-
say on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 629 (1976). 
41 390 U.S. \153. 
42 643 F.2dat 567-68 (Larson, J., dissenting). 
43 Moreover, the traffic will not always bear the maximum price. Even when third par-
ties pay most of the cost of medical care, for example, the patient mny he rrquired to poy 
some portion of the expense. These copayments will induce the patient. to shop for bargains. 
In addition, once a price has been set, the consumer will search for higher qtwlity. Low-
quality sellers must offer price concessions to obtain business. To equalize quelit.y, younger, 
lesi--experienced physicians would work for less, work under the supervision of nnother phy-
sician (who would keep part of the fee), or spend more time on each case. 
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minimum price does not answer this question. Unless it raises 
price, the agreement is either harmless or beneficial. 
Sometimes the source of savings from maximum prices is the 
identity between maximum and minimum price. The example in 
Part II-D illustrating how maximum prices enable suppliers to be-
come insurers shows this principle at work. The equation between 
maximum and actual price also accounts for any reduction in 
search costs. To say that the maximum pdce becomes the mini-
mum may be to praise the arrangement, not to criticize it. 
It is necessary, therefore, to ask more directly whether the 
maximum price agreement displays the reduced output and higher 
price characteristics of a cartel. The per se rule is no help here 
becaus& it avoids any questions concerning the effects of the agree-
ment. The appropriate method is the one used in Broadcast Mu-
sic. 44 If an axamination of the practice gives sound reasons for 
thinking that signific1:.nt efficiencies of the sort described in Part II 
ere at wor~, 2 more detailed inquiry is necessary!r. If such efficien-
cies are absent , foe arrangement should be found unlawful per se 
41t ordif-- to s.void the large litigation costs of searching for small 
efficiency gains:'6 
An inqui:y under the Rule of Reason should not however, be 
unduly conplex in mcXi::::num price fixing cases. At leas m prmci-
ple, there is an easy test. The court could determine whether the 
quantity supplied was higher in markets with maximum price 
fixing than in ma!'kets without.47 Such a direct. comparison, which 
may be possible with the aid of econometric tools,48 answers the 
44 441 U.S. at 8-9, 19-20. 
45 The qualifi~a~ion-"significa.'1t" efficiencies-is important. Any cartel will reduce 
search costs if it i3 enforced. (There ma{',.be offsetting increases-in cost as cartelists attempt 
to prevent price cheating by other firmitlJICartels may stabilize sales and improve the quali-
ty of information. Under some circumstances the long run gains of these savings could ex-
ceed the .allocative losses, See Dewey, Information, Entry, and Welfare: The Case for Collu-
sion, 69 AM. EcoN. R::v. 587 (1979). But antitrust law frequently disregards savings of this 
sort, because the conditions necessary to make cartels beneficial i11clude free entry and other 
criteria unlihly to prevail in practice; the short term losses almost certainly exceed the 
speculative long term gair,s. For the same reason that we ignore information cost justifica-
tions for cartels, we should disregard insubstantial efficiences nchievable by maximum price 
fixing. 
46 Catalano, Inc. v. 'I'!trget Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 648-49 (J 980 . 
47 See Easterbrook, supra note , at ; Landes & Posner, Market Power in. Anti-
trust Cases, 9·1 HARV. L. REV. 937, 972-74 (1981); nnd Posner, The Rllle of Reason and the 
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. Rr-:v. 1, 17-19 
(1977), for suggestions about using quantity and market share changes to assess the legality 
of particular practices. 
48 See Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 702 
17 
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central question about cartels. ( 
If it is not possible to determine whether the agreement led to 
an increase in output, it becomes necessary to resort to second-best 
devices. The theory of cartels advanced by George Stigler and 
elaborated by Richard Posner provides a starting point for the in-
quiry."9 Posner has developed a list of indicia that often distin-
guish cartels from competition when direct inquiries ("Did they 
sign an agreement in a smoke-filled room?!>) are not helpful. 
There is no need to recite those criteria here. Several inquiries, 
however, hold out special promise of utility in maximum price 
agreement cases. It seems most unlikely that a maximum price 
agreement is a disguised cartel if the sellers' market is not concen-
trated. Because it is costly to reach a cartel agreement, and even 
more costly to detect and punish cheating, markets with many sell-
ers cannot easily be cartelized. It will always be in the interest of 
some sellers to break ,-,ith the cartel, reduce prices, and so claim a 
greater s~a.:e of the business. When there are several large buyers, 
· ---\~,...... 
.· t§L~:~.; 
.: .. :~\ .{ 
., • , ~ 
this cheating could be ei pecially profitable, because the seller can -=- S ~ 
increase his business dramatically by appealing to a single substan-
tial buyer. Buyers, indeed, have every incentive to encourage 
cheating by fun!1elir:g business to sellers who will reduce price. 
Considerations of this sort indicate that maximum price fixing will 
rarely be a cartel in disguise. It appears in service industries such 
as optometry, retail sales, auto repair, and medical care in which 
there are hundreds of sellers and insurance CO!npa~ies can funnel 
bu.siness to sellers who shave prices. 
Some other inquiries also should help to separate cartels from 
efficiency-increasing maximum price agreements. If the market 
share of the sellers participating in the . agreement is small, they 
would not have sufficient market power to affect price, and a cartel 
explanation thus is unlikely. If the market .share of the partici-
-pants is growing, this indicates that the participants in the plan 
are not reducing output and so cannot be cartelizing. No cartel can 
profit by admitting all comers and doing nothing to halt an in-
crease in output by its members. The behavior of buyers also pro-
vides valuable evidence. If buyers readily cooperate in a maximum 
(1980). Econometric analysis requires, however, substantial data that may be difficult or 
impossible to obtain in particular cases. 
49 G. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J . PoL. EcoN. 44 (1964), reprinted in G. STIG-
LER'. THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39 (1968); R. PoSNER, supra note ,rt,ot 39-77. S ee also J.-0 
R. POSNl..:R & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note f,' at 336-46. ~ 5 
' • I '• .,: ' ~ -:~ • 
-... :,-,.:.:.: :~ :· 
....... , .. 
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price arrangement, they must perceive it to be beneficial; if, on the 
other hand, large buyers and insurers begin sending orders and in-
sureds to sellers outside the agreement, this wou]d suggest. the ex-
istence of a cartel. Finally, we could attempt to make a direct price 
comparison. Is the price of participants in the maximum price ar-
rangement lower than the price of nonmembers? The nnswer to 
this inquiry could be of ambiguous import_:_Jower prices may be 
associated with lower quality-but it is suggestive.t>0 
At least two inquiries, however, would be pointless. Little can 
be learned by asking whether sellers or buyers initiated t.he maxi-
mum price arrangement. As I have explained, buyer initiation may 
be more costly. Maximum price proposals by individual buyers are 
not maximum price fixing at all, and such proposals by groups of 
buyers (perhaps acting through insurers) simply substitute the 
poasibility of monopsony for the possibility of monopoly.61 Neither 
should be preferred to the other. 
We also learn little from whether the maximum price arrange-
ment affect3 the nu.:r.her of suppliers. A ,;artel often attracts a 
fringe of small, befficient suppliers that prosper only because the 
cartel price is h!gher than the more efficient firms' cost. of produc-
tion. A redt!ction in foe numbar of suppliers thus may nccompany 
the restor::tion of co!Ilpctition in a market. But ir. does not follow 
that the opening of many new, small firms shows that a cartel is at 
work. A new arrange:!!lent such as a maximum price agreement 
could ms.ke it possible for new suppliers io compete more eff ec-
tively with e:stablished fi:ms. 5 ~ A reduction in the numbel' of sup-
plie s could occur just es easily. Perhaps the price schedule has 
made ee.ch existing supplier more efficient--for example, t.he phy-
sician who is able to see more patients when he stoos filling out as G'\ 
/ many forms-so that output rises even as the n~ r of sellers ~ 
50 In t Maricopa case hese inquires indicate that the maximum price arrangement 
. is not. a carte · disguise. The market share of the medical foundations appears to be large 
and growing; insurer$ have participated in the program and do not, apparently, seek to di-
rect their pstients to physicians who do not belong, The pric'Xharged in the program ('the 
r,aroe as or lower than the bills submitted by "eighty-five to mnety-five µercent of physicians 
in 1v1aricop11 County". 643 F.2d at 555. 
51 There is thc-refore no basis for distinguishing a case like Maricopa from ra case like 
Royal Drug. In Royal Drug, Blue Shield proposed II prescription drng price of cost plus 11 
dispensing fee of $2. 440 U.S. at 209. Blue Shield was acting ns agent for the policyholders, 
just as in Maricopa the foundations were acting as agents of physicians. 
52 See Ei~enberg, supra note 31, for 1111 argument that relative value scales for physi-
cians are especially valuable to young practitioners who lack the information of their 1 /. 
competitors. ------------------------see 4./5., L1.r1K, ~,vcZh 
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falls. A Rule of Reason inquiry therefore should disregard changes 
in the number of suppliers. 
B. Monopsony · 
If the buyers' side of the market is concentrated and the sell-
ers' side unconcentrated, it is possible that maximum price fixing 
is a consequence of monopsony. The inquiries suggested above 
could be used to detect monopsony as well · as monopoly. A price 
decrease coupled with a declining output would mark the onset of 
monopsony. 
Monopsony is inconceivable in most cases. The optometrists 
or General Motors dealers who ban~together to advertise a maxi- ~ d 
mum price are not reaching out to subject themselves to monop-
sony. Even when the buyers' market is concentrated, a monopsony 
explanation u.sually is implausible. In ihe case of physicians' maxi-
mum fee schedules, for instance, the insurance companies have no 
way to mt:.ke a monopsony work. To depress prices they must cur-
te.il pcrcbs.scs; the purchase decision, however, is made by the in-
sured patient, a:1d once the patient has insurance, the marginal 
cost of hes::aii:.h care is well below the price paid by the insurer. It is 
hardly possible to reduce the consumers' purchases of medical care 
by low=ring the prices they pay! Moreover, any group of insurance 
compa.-ii~s th~t sought to curtail the use of medical care enough to 
depress prices would cause consumers to go elsewhere for insur-
ance, and physicians would withdraw from the plan .. Firms offering 
coverage sufficient to purchase the quantity of services patients de-
sired would have an adva..>1tage in selling policies. Thus if the mo-
nopsony explanation prevailed, the insurers subscribing to the 
maximum price plan would lose market shar.e, as happens when 
monopoly is at work. If the share of firms (buyers or sellers) partic-
Jpating in the arrangement is increasing, this indicates efficiency-
creating behavior rather than monopoly or monopsony. 
C. Entry Deterrence 
The final objection to maximum price fixing is that it impedes 
entry. Indeed, Professor Sullivan says that the "most likely" expla-
nation for maximum prices is that "sellers (in an oligopolistic in-
dustry) fear entry if prices go higher and are conspiring to prevent 
this."G3 Sullivan characterizes entry-deterring pricing as a distor-
53 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 01' ANTITRUST 211 (1977). Sullivan nlso ad-
vances, albeit hesitantly, two other objections to maximum price fixing: that maximum 
prices will stifle changes in product characteristics nnd will 1locate short supplies on non- C .R..-:. 
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tion of the economy's ability to equate supply and demand. Others 
have expressed a similar concern;~' it is known in economics as 
limit pricing.~~ 
Those who advance this objection usually do not explain why 
lower prices deter entry. If the ma_ximum price is less than margi-
nal cost, the objection is the one usually advanced against preda-
tory pricing. A maximum price less than marginal cost would pre-
vent new entry for as long as the low price prevailed, but 
competition would resume as soon as the conspirators raised prices 
in an attempt to recoup. If the li:r::1it price exceeds marginal cost, 
however, the argument r:::iust be that certain firms, despite being 
able to set a monopoly price, have agreed to charge less than the 
monopoly price in order:." to :educe the risk of entry. 
It is far from clear thn: li;";'">it p:-icing for this latter purpose is 
"1desirable. The welfare loss from the entry-deterring price may 
a less than the welfare loss from the monopoly price. Even though 
the entry-deterring price ,:;,·ill last longer, consumers do not lose as 
much in the early years as thay do und-=r monopoly pricing. The 
monopoly price attracts relatively inafficient firms, which limit 
price grounds. He does not, ho7,eve:, offer any argu:nent to support these concern,. There is 
no reason why maximum price agre,e:nents would impede innovation. And Sullivan does not 
show bow conspirators could profit by allocating short supplies by quota rather tha;:i by 
price. I therefore disregard these potential objections. j.fn analysis of "stabilization car-
teh,''-agreement..~ to keep pr:ce constant over time despite changes in demand-leads to 
the conclusion thJt such agreements sometimes benefit consumers. F.J. SCHERER, .lNnus-
'l'RIAL MARKl::T ST,WCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERl'ORM.\NCE 216-20 (2d ed. l ~ O). QueJting may 
he preferable to price in allocating goods when there are unanticipated changes in demand. 
D. Carlton, The Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of :r,...Iarkets (Mar. 1981) 
(paper presented at National Bureau of Economics Conference on Inflation) (on file with 
':.'he University of Chicago Law Review). 
A+ ~11 
C.4 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 565-68 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(Larson, J. ~ issenting), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981); Kallstrom, supra note 29, at -:: )' 
673-84; Hav1ghurst., Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Ser-
vices, 35 LA;v & CoNTEMP. PROB. 716, 768-70 (1970); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 9-10, Maricop~ (''competing doctors have a 7,-
financial incentive to limit their fees by agreement only if that would limit new entry .... 
[T]he agrec:ments ... could be used as devices to impede entry by competing systems of 
prepaid health care, such as health maintenance organizations dHMOs'), or to forestall the ,:_~=-
development of other typ~s of health care systems deemed unte\irahle by physicians oper-
ot:ng uncl,<r tlfe currently prevailing methods."). 
S3-=. 55 For stl\tements in support of the limit pricing theory, see F.M. Scrnmrn, supra note 
at 2::12-52)..and Gaskins, Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of En- cf 
3 J. EcoN. Tm:ORY 306 (1971). For discussions by non-believers see Easterbrook, supra 
At' ~ nt 296-97; McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. ~ & EcoN. 289, 307-16 
( :'.180); PRshiginn, Limit Price and the Marhet Share of the Leading Firm, 16 J. INDUS. 
::.:toi.. 1G5 (1968). 
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pncmg excludes. The productive inefficiencies of these firms are 
among the costs of monopoly. An argument that an industry prone 
to cartelization should be prevented from engaging in limit pricing 
thus is open to question.66 
Even if limit pricing is harmful, though, it is rare. Someone 
who maintains that a maximum price agreement is an example of 
entry-deterring pricing must establish that (1) the firms could have 
charged a monopoly price; (2) the limit price retards entry; and (3) 
buyers cannot maneuver around the limit price. None of these 
demonstrations is easy. . 
1. lvfonopoly Price. Sellers ordinarily can charge a monopoly 
price only if the market is concentrated. Sullivan explicitly quali-
fies his objection to maximum prices with a reference to oligop-
oly. 57 If the sellers' market does not contain a dominant firm, a 
cartel, or oligopolists engaged in tacit collusion, there is no reason 
to worry that maximum price agreements amount to a forbearance 
to collect a monopoly price.!',11 Yet most of the examples of maxi-
mum price agreements involve rnar~ets that are unconcentrated on 
the sellers' side, such e..s nedical s~rvices and retail sales. 
2. Limit Price and Entry. Limit pricing usually does not 
,imit entry. Firms C8-'1 sbw down entry by charging a price less 
than the monopoly price b'.lt more t!:a..'1 the competitive price only 
if either the industry has significa..-,t economies of scale, or the po-
tential entrants have costs higher than the incumbents (for exam-
ple, if there is a barrier to entry). Economies of scale slow down 
entry because a new firm must build a ph ... '1t big enough to produce 
a significant fraction of the industry's output. This is a risky ven-= 
ture, and existing firms ca..'1 make it more risky by holding capacity 
in reserve at the limit price. They effectively set a trap for en-
. trants, ready to pounce if entry takes place. If there are barriers to 
entry, incumbent firms can protect their markets by charging 
slightly more than the costs the entrant would incur. 
I doubt that limit pricing restricts entry even when there are 
economies of scale.e19 Moreover, it is unlikely that incumbent firms 
engaged in limit pricing can make a profit larger than if they just 
53 r, M 510 F.2d 894 (lOfo Cir.), cert. dismissed, l -----.... 
57 L. SULIVAN, supra note , at 211)423 -U.8.802 (197'5},appearCTo hold that a mo- \ 
~olist may eligage in fimiCpricin·g.--- ---· 
- ss7Jn·Trie-coilcritionstlial generate monopoly profits or support tacit collusion, see 
Land1.:s & Posner, supra note ~ see also R. POSNER & F. EASTERRROOK, supra note ~ 2.5> 
331-46. ~ 
59 The' reasons for my doubt.~ are elaborated in the articles cited in note f supra. - S-5_, 
• • • r • ..... -.. -·- ... ~. 
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set the monopoly price and let entry occur naturally. But one can 
reject Sullivan's concern even if one does not share my doubts. 
Sellers that employ maximum price agreements do not have signif-
icant scale economies. The agreements are used in markets where 
each seller has only a trivial share. Moreover, those who express 
concern about maximum price fixing do not seem to believe that 
the agreements impede entry by noble but less efficient rivals. The 
argument seems to be, rather, that the "excluded" potential en-
trants (such as health maintenance organizations or other prepaid 
health plans) are more efficient tha."'1 those doing the "excluding" 
(such as physicians engaged in fee-for-service practice). This is im-
possible. No system of limit prices can exclude competition by 
more efficient rivals. The only way for the incumbents (in an in-
dustry without scale economies) to limit entry is to reduce their 
prices to the cCP.3ts of the potential entrants. And if the entrants' 
costs are lower th:ir1 the incumbents', the incumbents will go broke. 
3. B:.1-yers and the Limit Price. Buyers can foil most limit 
prici!'lg scheoes based on scale economies by signing Jong-term 
contracts with entr~nts.60 Because the limit price exceeds the ri-
val's cost, 2-..11d the only thing keeping the rivals out of the market 
is the risk that the incumbent.; will sell first and leave the entrant 
·with insufficient demand to support the business and reap the 
economies of scale, cmtomers ca.ri help rivals by guaranteeing them 
sufficient demand to reach efficient scales of production. If custom-
ers are willing to help entrants in this way, incumbents can deter 
entry only by cha:::-ging the competitive price. Limit pricing by phy-~ 
sicians - overcome by insurance companies"'spon-~ 
soring rival forms of practice.61 
In sum, the argument that maximum price agreements deter 
entry is ridiculouswnen refern ng to more efficient potential en-
trants ancl impl~sib1e when referring to entrants that must oper-
ate at a certain minimum scale to be efficient. It can safely be dis-
regarded as a source of antitrust concern. 
CO See Easterbroo\t, supra note , at 270-71, 287, 293-94, for a discussion of the role of 
long-term contracts in overcoming ontry-deterring strat!'gies. 
61 For example, insurers could establish their own health maintenance organizations. 
Lo:-ig term contracts between the insurers and the HMOs would assure the survival of this 
form of practice, end if HMOs' costs are lower than the cost.~ of traditional prnctice, the 
insurers would have no difficulty signing up customers. Thus entry would occur-indeed be 
encouraged- despite limit pricing. 
,..__ 
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IV. HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS AND THE PER SE RULE 
The Supreme Court invented the per se rule against price 
fixing to deal with the argument, frequently advanced by cartelists 
in earlier years, that the agreed-on price was "reasonable" and 
therefore legal. The Court replied that the reasonableness of the~') 
price is irrelevant in a cartel case.62 It was surely ise to refuse to ~ 
entertain such reasonableness arguments. price is reasonable 
only in relation to marginal cost at the competitive output, and the 
objection to cartels is that they reduce output to Jess than the 
competitive quantity. No cartel price is reasonable in an economic 
sense. Even if the Court were prepared to undertake the heroic 
task of determining the variance between the competitive price 
and the cartel price, it would have no ground for saying that a par-
ticular deviation was acceptable. An argument that a cutback in 
output and a "reasonable" price increase are justified by some 
other purpose would be "nothing less than a frontal assault on the 
basic policy of the Sherman Act. . .. [T]he statutory policy pre-
cludes inquizy into the question whether competition is good or 
bad."6 3 
.But ~ £11~ it rejected the cartels' attempts to argue the reason- A 1-ti-.ov~'-'. 
~bleness of their prices, the Court accepted the proposition that 
not all cooperative behavior is unlawful. United S tates v. A ddys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co.M recognized that restrain ts "ancillary" to 
lawful, productive conduct a.re themselves lawful. Sometimes these 
ancillary restraints entailed cooperation among competitors, but 
the cooperation was not subject to automatic condemnation. The 
Court's announcement in the Madison Oil case6 ~ that the law does 
not permit any inquiry- into the economic justification for coopera-
tion among rivals therefore reversed a longstanding approach to 
the per se doctrine. The Court did not cite Addyston or discuss the 
rationale (if there was one) for expanding per-se treatment from a 
rejection of "reasonableness-of-price" arguments to a rejection of 
all conceivable arguments. It simply asserted the conclusion. 
The approach· of Madison Oil led to the per se condemnation 
of a wide variety of practices, including all sorts of cooperation 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392~ 1927); United St.ates 
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290k 1897). 
63 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). 
6-i 85 F. 271U6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 21l (1899). 
65 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940). 
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among partially integrated firms.66 But it is impossible to justify a 
rule that refuses to examine the benefits of particular arrange-
ments, no matter how substantial those benefits may be. The Suk -:: r ~ 
reme Court has never taken the per se rule as seriously as its state-
ments might imply-consider the fate of at.torneys who join in a 
partnership and agree on hourly fees for the1.r services-and in re-
cent cases, the Court has revived the earlier approach, so that sub-
stantial savings from cooperative endeavors avoid per se condem-
nation. The approval of the blanket license for musical 
compositions 4f the most vivid example.67 Sometimes Addyston's \ S 
ancillary restraint test will help a court identify those arrange-
ments so likely to benefit consumers that more detailed scrutiny is 
desi:able. Sometimes such identifiable benefits will exist indepen-
denti of a.,.--:y "a_ncill;:.ry" arrangement among the competitors. -::- I~ 
Surely nothing should turn on the existence of an ancillary ar-
ra..,gene:.;t; the pertinent question is whether the prosptci of con-
sumer benefits is su£5cient for a court to attempt the difficult and 
costly inquiry inio their existence. 
The costs of trying to separate beneficial 2greements among 
competitors from anticompetitive agreements are large; one partic-
ular cost is the chance of error. Thus trivial savings are not enough 
to initiate an inquiry. The fact that cartels may save on selling 
costs by using a joint sales agent, for example,. would not be 
enough to avoid the per se rule absent proof of some dramatic 
economies of scale in selling; (Such economies are unlikely.) The 
fact that a. uniform cartel price reduces consumers' search costs 
also would be insufficient to avoid the rule; because cartel members 
have an incentive to shave the price and so capture additional 
sales, consumers would have an incentive to search for price-cut-
ters, and search costs might even rise as a result.08 At some point, 
though, the savings from cooperation become so large in relation to 
the costs of inquiry (including the costs of error) under the Rule of 
Reason that there is no longer adequate justification for using per 
66 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596¼1972) (division of terri- -z:~ 6 0 8 
tories incident to trademark promotion by loosely affiliated stores is illegal per se); United 
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (territorial arrangement involving price restrictions 
11nd advertising passover payments among competing manufact.urers of a sirigle brand of 
mattress is illegal), 
6'7 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Bro11dcasting Sys., Jnc., 441 U.S. J (1979). ~ 
68 For this reason, Catalano, In~ t Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643 1980 is cons·:it~nt ~ } J/-6' 
V.:ith the position I have adopted.~ 1ote supra, discussing Professor Dewey's O.ct/1,\. 
views. 
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se rules. I have argued in this article that the balance shifts when 
rivals agree to set maximum prices. It should be possible to ex-
amine the maximum price agreement and determine with some re-
liability whether consumers saye or whether, instead, the agree-
ment is a dis~ised cartel. This inquiry may cause aiscomfortt,_.o--
those who are used to the idea that all price fixing is unlawful. We 
cannot, however, long afford to follow a per se rule that condemns 
efficient practices simply because they have names similar to those 
of other practices that are more likely to be anticompetitive. 
. .. ... . ~-~----------... 
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jsw 01/30/82 
Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: Arizona v. Maricopa County 
This draft presents the theory on which I propose this 
case be decided. I would 1 i ke to add more case authority, 
which I will be able to do swiftly. But this draft presents my 
essential reasoning in as concise a fashion as I have been able 
to manage. 
I add two thoughts for the moment. First, if you 
think this version is too short, either on facts or on cita-
tions to the record, I can supply either or both of these from 
prior (and longer!) drafts. 
Second, I question whether this should be a per 
curiam. I know that is what the Chief assigned. But this 
opinion as written will be a significant precedent. The case 
has been fully briefed and argued. The Court wi 11 probably 
divide 4-3. And Justice Stevens probably will write a lengthy 
dissent. A per curiam label seems anomalous under these cir-
cumstances. 
I have given David a copy of this. I will return from 
Havard Monday evening, and plan to have a fully cited version 
shortly thereafter. 
February 1, 1982 
HUNT GINA-POW 
To: John Wiley 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
Subject: 80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society 
I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first I have 
seen), on which I have done my usual editing. The only 
substantial revision was in the latter portion of the 
opinion. My impresssion was that your draft was a bit 
repetitive at that point. 
Sally has been good enough to make a clean copy that 
includes my editing. I deliver this also. 
In the time available to me, I have not gone back and 
reread the briefs or even Judge Sneed's opinion - as 
normally I like to do. I assume that you have included or 
2. 
rejected the principal points made by Judge Sneed. He is a 
judge whom I respect. You may recall that he was _~ ean ~ 
at Duke before becoming Deputy Attorney General. 
Also, I assume that the draft is fair to petitioner, 
although I think it appropriate - on summary judgment to 
. J\ 
emphasize arguments advanced by respondents that justify a 
full record. 
Finally, the draft is 
citation of authority, or secondary. You 
stated that you intended to do some further r I 
would hope some assistance could be obtained in respect 
from the cases cited in the briefs and opinions below. 
I hope you~-can accomplish this promptly. I would think 
a day or two with the cases should suffice. We have been 
two months in reaching the draft stage of this case. I 
agree with you as to its importance, but in view of other 
• J 
3. 
commitments here we should move this into circulation as 
promptly as possible. 
As to making this a Court opinion (which I also would 
like), this suggestion must come from the Chief Justice or 







February 1, 1982 
Subject: 80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society 
I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first t have 
seen), on w~ich I have done my usual editing. _ The only 
substantial revision was in the latter portion of the 
opinion. My impresssion was that your draft was a bit 
repetitive at that point. 
qally has been qnod enough to make a clean copy that 
includes mv editing. I deliver this also. 
In thP time available to me, t have not gone back and 
reread the briefs or even Judge Sneed's oµinion - as 
normally I like to do. I assume that you have included or 
rejected the principal points made by Judge Sneed. He is a 
judge whom I respect. You may recall that he was Dean at 
Duke before becoming Deputy Attorney General. 
Also, I assume that the draft is fair to petitioner, 
although I think it appropriate - on summary judgment - to 
emphasize arguments advanced by respondents that justify a 
full record. l 
February 2, 1982 
JOHN GINA-POW 
To: John Wiley 
From: LFP, Jr. 
Subject: 80-419 - Arizona v. Marcopia Medical 
I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first I have 
seen), on which I have done my usual editing. The most 
substantial revision was in the latter portion of the 
opinion, where there seemed to be some reptition. 
In addition to returning your draft, I have had Sally 
make a clean copy that includes my editing. 
I now think that I was mistaken as to the type of 
opinion. The sentiment among the four Justices who voted 
generally for a remand was that this could be accomplished 
in a few paragraphs, as both the DC and CA9 had remanded the 
case. I rather thought we should give additional guidance 
from this Court. Our assignment, however, was only to write 
a brief per curiam. At my request, you have undertaken to 
do a per curiam long enough to give some guidance.~ I am 
now persuaded that this compromise type opinion is not good 
enough. For reasons stated below, your draft as edited is 
not entirely persuasive. It should either be expanded into 





paragraph agreeing that on the record before us the summary 
judgment motion was correctly denied. 
We should discuss which of these courses to pursue. If 
you think you can expand the present draft into a Court 
opinion in a reasonable period of time, I would prefer this. 
I am thinking of an opinion that would probably add only 
three or four pages to what is already written. But it has 
taken two months to produce this draft, and we simply cannot 
afford to spend more than a few additional days on this case 
before going to press. 
The areas in the draft that need elaboration include 
the following: 
1. We should state the substance of Arizona's 
argument. This could be added on page 4, following the 
sentence stating that the complaint was filed. This is 
necessry to give our opinion a proper balance. 
2. Except for Broadcast Music, the antitrust analysis 
is almost totally devoid of the citation of authority. I 
recognize that there is no controlling case, but surely some 
support is available in what has been written in other 
cases. The opinions of the DC and CA9 cite some of the 
cases that may help. The Michigan Law Review comment cited 
by the DC certainly merits inclusion in a footnote. 
The draft emphasizes "efficiencies", and normally these 
are irrelevant where there is a horizontal price-fixing 
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3. 
of "efficiency" and resulting "economy"? At least we should 
quote at some appropriate place the sentence inv13roadcast 
Music (441 U.S. at 21, reading as follows: 
"Moreover, a bulk license of some type is a 
necessary consequence of the integration 
necessary to achieve these efficiencies, and 
a necessary consequence of an aggregate 
license is that its price must be 
established." 
Perhaps some brief elaboration should precede the quote. 
I wrote •GTE Sylvania. Although it involved vertical 
rather than horizontal price-fixing, you might take a look 
to see if there is any helpful language in it. I tried then 
to reinstate emphasis on the rule of reason. 
Can we properly use any language in/Nat. Society of 
Professional Engineers? 
The State's petition for cert attacks Judge Sneed's 
opinion for emphasizing economies and efficiencies. It is 
therefore important, since we also rely on these, to bolster 
our position with citations to the extent these are 
available. 
3. As the opinion of the DC emphasizes, 
feearrangements by professions - especially the learned 
profession - have been viewed differently from price-fixing 
in the commercial world. I would not devote more than a 
sentence or two to this point, but would cite - either in 
the text or in a note (with quotation) - authoritives 















A couple of minor points: 
J (a) when the term "agreement" is used in several 
places, it is not clear what agreement we are talking about. 
My understanding is that the FMC makes a master agreement 
with an insurance company, and then enters into individual 
agreements with the physicians. Thus, in a sense there are 
"third-party beneficiaries" relationships. Am I right about 
this? In any event, at some point we ought to made clear 
what we are talking about. 
I 
/ (b) I would prefer using the term "physician" rather 
than doctor, as there are all sorts of "doctors" (including 
me!) • 
(c) The quotation on page 3 of your draft from the 
"agreement" is incomprehensible. If it is a correct quote, 
I suggest that you forget the quote and simply paraphrase 
its meaning. 
In two or three places I have reframed sentences in 
your draft that simply were not clear to me. It is possible 
that I have altered the meaning in doing so. You might be 
alert to this possibility. 
*** 
If we expand the opinion along the forgoing lines, and 
are satisfied with it, I will write a note to the Conference 
explaining that when I went to work on the case, I concluded 
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opinion. We may not sell this, but I am willing to try 
unless you think it will require another substantial 
commitment of your time. 
















80-419 - Arizona v. Marcopia Medical 
I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first I have 
seen), on which I have done my usual editing. The most 
substantial revision was in the latter portion of the 
opinion, where there seemed to be some repti. tion. 
In addition to returning your draft, I have had Sally 
make a clean copy that includes my editing. 
I now think that I was mistaken as to the type of 
opinion. The sentiment among the four Justices who voted 
generally for a remand was that thls could be accomplished 
ln a few paragraphs, as both the DC and CA9 had remanded the 
case. I rather thought we should give additional guidance 
from this Court. Our assignment, however, was only to write 
a brief per curi.am. At my request, you have undertaken to 
do a per cur i am long enough to qi ve some guidance._ I am 
now persuaded that this compromise type opinion i9 not good 
enough. For reasons stated below, your draft as edited is 
not entirely persuasive. It should either be expanded into 
what would be a Court opinion, or cut back to perhaps a 
2. 
paragraph agreeing that on the record before us the summary 
judgment motion was correctly denied. 
We should discuss which of these courses to pursue. If 
you think you can expand the present draft into a Court 
opinion in a reasonable period of time, I would prefer this. 
I am thinking of an opinion that would probahly add only 
three or four pages to what is already written. But it has 
taken two months to produce this draft, and we simply cannot 
afford to spend more than a few additional days on this case 
before going to press. 
The areas in the draft that need elaboration include 
the following: 
1. We should state the substance of Arizona's 
argument. This could be added on page 4, followinq the 
sentence stating that the comolaint was filed. This is 
necessry to give our opinion a oroper balance. 
2. Except for Broadcast Music, the antitrust analysis 
is almost totally devoid of the citation of authority. I 
recognize that there is no controlling case, but surely some 
support is available in what has been written in other 
cases. The opinions of the DC and CA9 cite some of the 
cases that may help. The Michigan r .. aw Review comment cited 
by the DC certainly merits inclusion in a footnote. 
The draft emphasizes "efficiencies", and normally these 
are irrelevant where there is a horizontal price-fixing 
agreement. Is there case authority supporting the relevancy 
3. 
of "efficiency" and resulting "economy"? At least we should 
quote at some appropriate place the sentence in Broadcast 
Music (441 u.s. at 21, reading as follows: 
"Moreover, a bulk license of some type is a 
necessary consequence of the integration 
necessary to achieve these efficiencies, and 
a necessary consequence of an aggregate 
license is that its price must be 
established." 
Perhaps some brief elaboration should precede the quote. 
I wrote GTE Sylvania. Although it involved vertical 
rather than horizontal price-fixing, you might take a look 
to see if there is any helpful language in it. ! tried then 
to reinstate empha.sis on the rule of reason. 
Can we properly use anv language in Nat. Society of 
Professional Enqineers? 
The State's petition for cert attacks Judge Sneed's 
opinion for emphasizing economies and efficienci.es. It is 
therefore important, since we also rely on these, to bolster 
our position with citations to the extent these are 
available. 
3. As the opinion of the DC emphasizes, 
feearrangements by professions - especially the learne~ 
profession - have been viewed differently from price-fixing 
in the commercial world. I would not devote more than a 
sentence or two to this point, but would cite - either in 
the text or in a note (with quotation) - authoritives 
supporting this difference. 
4. 
*** 
A couple of minor points: 
(a) when the term "agreement" is used in several 
places, it is not clear what agreement we are talking about. 
My understanding is that the FMC makes a master agreement 
with an insurance company, and then enters into individual 
agreements with the physicians. Thus, in a sense there are 
"third-party beneficiaries" re lat ionshi.ps. Am I right about 
this? In any event, at some point we ought to made clear 
what we are talking about. 
(b) I would prefer using the term "physician" rather 
than ~octor, as there are all sorts of "doctors" (including 
me 1) • 
(c) The quotation on page 3 of your draft from the 
"agreement" is incomprehensihle. If it is a correct quote, 
t suggest that you forget the quote and simply paraphrase 
its meaning. 
In two or three places I have reframed sentences in 
your draft that simply were not clear to me. It is possible 
that I have altered the meaning In doing so. You might be 
alert to this possibilitv. 
*** 
If we expand the opinion along the forgoing lines, and 
are satisfied with it, I will write a note to the Conference 
explaining that when I went to work on the case, t concluded 
that we could not afford aporopriate guidance without an 
opinion. We may not sell this, but I am willing to try 
unless you think it will require another substantial 
commitment of your time. 






John Wiley DATE: Feb. 9, 1982 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County 
I like the draft of February 8. 
Apart from essentially stylistic editing, my only 
change is to condense the final three pages of the draft. 
Not only does this marginally aid in reducing the length of 
the opinion, but it eliminates the repeating of respondents' 
arguments on pages 17 and 18. I also would relegate to a 
footnote the point as to the arguably adverse posture of the 
insurance companies. The more I think of this argument, the 
less persuasive it seems. 
I have not read recently some of the cases you 
cite, and rely on you for the appropriateness of their use. 
Several of the Justices here know a good deal about 
antitrust law, and our opinion will be scrutinized closely. 
If you have questions about my changes, we can 
discuss them. Otherwise, run a fifth draft, have a co-clerk 
take a good look at it, and then have a Chambers Draft 
printed. You will note that I will circulate this as a 
memorandum, hoping it will become a Court opinion. 
In a memorandum accompanying the circulation, I 
will acknowledge that we were asked only to do a PC. But 
... 
~ 
. ~ . ' 
2. 
upon consideration, I conclude that a remand without 
discussion would afford no guidance to the District Court, 
particularly in view of the fact that there were three 




















John Wiley DATE: Feb. 9, 1982 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-419 Arizona v. ~aricopa County 
I l.ike the draft of February a. 
Apart from eAsentially stylistic erlltinq, mv only 
change is to condense the final three pages of the nraft. 
Not only does thip, mar~inally aid in reducing the length of 
the opinion, but it eliminates the repeating of. resoondents' 
arguments on pages 17 and 18. I also would relegate to a 
footnote the point as to the arguably adverse posture of the 
insurance companies. The more I think of thiq argument, the 
less persuasive it seems. 
I have not read recently some of the cases you 
cite, and rely on you for the appropriateness of their use. 
Several of the Justices here know a good deal about 
antltrust law, and our opinion will he scrutinized closely. 
Tf you have questions about my chanqes, we can 
dlscuss them. Otherwise, run a fifth ~raf.t, have a co-clerk 
take a good look at it, and then have a ~hambers Draft 
printed. You will note that I will circulate this as a 
memorandum, hoping i.t will become a Court opinion. 
In a memorandum accompanying the circulation, I 
will acknowledqe that we were asked only to do a PC. But 
2. 
upon consideration, I conclude that a remand without 
discussion would afford no guldance to the District Court, 
particularly in view of the fact that there were three 
separate - and differing - opinions by the Court of Appeals. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
February 24, 1982 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
There were four votes (only seven of us sat) to 
remand this case for a more fully developed factual record. 
I was requested to draft a Per Curiam to this effect. 
The case is here in an unsatisfactory posture. 
The state filed the complaint alleging a violation of ~1 of 
the Sherman Act, and moved for partial summary ju~gment on a 
pet se theory. The District Judge deni.ed the motion, 
holding that there was no Per se violation and that the rule 
of reason should be applied. The DC concJuded, however, 
that the evidence was insufficient to make a judgment on the 
merits, and - apparently seeking guidance - certified an 
appeal under Sl292(b). 
A panel of CA9 split three ways. Judge Sneed 
affirmed, agreeing with the DC that there was no per se 
violation. Judge Kennedy concurred in the affirmance, but 
made clear that he would leave open until the record was 
complete the question of a per se violation. Judge Larson 
dissented, agruing that a per se violation had been shown. 
In these circumstances, if we remanded without 
affording some guidance, the DC would be in precisely the 
position it was prior to certifying the appeal. With three 
separate opinions from CA9, I suppose the DC simply would 
adhere to its view that there was no per se violation. 
Accordingly, I have written a rather full 
memorandum that purports to give some guidance to the DC on 
remand. My memorandum would leave entirely open the 
ultimate decision of the case after a fully developed 
factual record enables the court to resolve the unanswered 
questions. 
L. F. P. , ,Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 02/09/82 Rider A, p. 17 (Maricopa) 
MAR14 SALLY-POW 
As noted above in Part III, the justifications advanced 
for the role of physicians merit consideration. It 
certainly is not clear on the record before us that this 
plan fails to benefit insured patients or 
thaf participation by physicians in the setting of maximum 
~ 
fees is not essential to -ehe success. Broadcast Music, 
Inc., supra, at 20-21.* 
* John, add here in summary form, the point that the 
willing participation by the insurance companies that have ~ 
an interest arguably adverse to cartel arrangements, may 
provide additional support to respondents' arguments. 
Also, John, some of your footnotes in the final 
few pages of your present draft may merit adding. 
,. 
2. 
In sum, it cannot be said that no genuine issue of 
material fact is present on this record and that 
petitioner is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). Petitioner has not discharged 
its burden of proving that respondents 
have entered a plainly anticompetitive combination wanting 
in any substantial justification. 14 This holding does 
not, of course, immunize the medical service plan at 
issue. Petitioner is free to prove, if it can, its 
averments with respect to the anticompetitive effects of 
the plan. Nor is petitioner foreclosed from showing that 
respondents' justifications of the plan are not 
substantial or that the alleged efficiencies could not be 
achieved in its absence. If the District Court finds that 
petitioner has failed to establish a per se violation of 
3. 
the Sherman Act, the question will remain whether the plan 
comports with the rule of reason. See United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441, n. 16 (1978). 
A more fully developed factual record is necessary to 
determine the answers to these questions. 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
j,uputttt (!Jqurl qf tlrt 11'.nitth ;imtts 
:Jfmt',ltittghtn, ~- <!J. 2llffe'I!' 
February 26, 1982 
Re: 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Dear Lewis: 
The analysis in your memorandum is somewhat 
puzzling. If the maximum price fixing arrangement 
is illegal per se--as I believe it is--I do not 
understand how any of the three justifications can 
save it. If you are saying that an arrangement is 
not a "price fixing" agreement that deserves per se 
condemnation if the participants are motivated by 
any purpose except stifling competition, not much 
will remain of the per se doctrine. In any event, 
I intend to adhere to the position I took in Conference 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.fnprtnu ~ltmi ltf tlrt 'Jmttb _fbdts: 
jflaglpngton. J. QJ. 2llffe~, 
March 1, 1982 
Re: No. 80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Dear Lewis: 
I am in substantial agreement with the third draft of 
your memorandum and will join it if it becomes an opinion 
of the Court. 
Sincerely 'v/ 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.iu:p-rrmt <!Jottrl of tlrt ~th .:§tatt.tr 
~~n. ~- cq. 20ffe){.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 3, 1982 
Re: 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await John's dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
ju:vrttttt C!+iturl o-f tJrt 'Jlhri.tth Jtait.tl' 
~Jrmgto-n. J. <!+• 2llffe~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 3, 1982 
Re: 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await John's dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
J;u.µum~ (!J4ttttt d tq~ ~ttlt.tb j5taus 
Jbt.sqittgbm. ~- QJ. 2ll.;i,., 
March 4, 1982 
Re: No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society 
Dear Lewis and John: 
Will the one of you who ultimately "prevails" in this 




cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
'}~ ... -·~ ... . ·.; 
'• . 
4 .. "'~: ·1 .. · - : 
'I 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.p-ume <qouri of tqt~h ;§taftg 
..-u!rmghln. J. QJ. 2llffe~~ 
March 15, 1982 
Re: No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa· County Medical 
Society 
Dear Lewis: 
You will recall my position at Conference was to 
"DIG" or affirm. I am in general agre ement with a 
remand but I will, of course, give careful attention to 
what John writes, as I am sure you will also. This 
is another "sticky" case, and we appreciate your 
willingness to take on,the "memo"' assignment. 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
March 16, 1982 
PERSONAL 
80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your note, and I understand, of 
course, why you are waiting to see what John writes even 
though you are "in general agreement" with me. 
My understanding is that John thinks a per se 
violation already has been shown, and therefore he would 
reverse on the merits. This would be contrary to your vote 
at Conference to DIG or affirm. 
so that I 
opinion. 
will have 
Only s~ven of us are participating in this case, 
will neea you and Byron if there ls to be a Court 
In the absence of a Court opinion here, the oc 
no idea how to decide the case on remand. 
I write this note only to you. Byron is also 
awaiting John's dissent. If you are still "with me" when 
that is ci. rculated, a prompt join note would be helpful. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss , 
Sincerely, 









From: Justice Stevens 
82 Circulated: __________ _ 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-419 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. MARICOPA 
COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1982) 
Memorandum of JUSTICE STEVENS. 
The State of Arizona moved for summary judgment on the 
issue of liability. Its position was that the respondents' un-
rebutted allegations, even if true, were insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to avoid the application of the per se rule against 
horizontal price fixing. The State maintains that position 
before this Court. If the State is correct, then it is entitled 
to reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment and to entry of 
partial summary judgment. 
The respondents' brief, the Court of Appeals' majority 
opinion, and JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum have identi-
fied a number of genuine issues of fact in this case. For 
every factual issue that might require a trial for its resolu-
tion, however, there is a preliminary legal question about the 
relevance of that issue. If we decide the preliminary legal 
question adversely to the respondents, then there is no need 
to decide the corresponding factual issue. 
First. The issue of fact is whether the restraint that 
purports to be a maximum price fixing agreement is ac-
tually a masquerade for an agreement to fix specific 
prices and to progressively increase the market price for 
medical services. The issue of law is whether maximum 
price fixing agreements are per se un awful. 
~ -
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Second. The issue of fact is whether the maximum 
prices fixed by the doctors are above or below those that 
would result from purely competitive conditions. The 
issue of law is whether the le alit of a rice fixmg 
agreement turns on w e er the fixed prices are 
r ~- ----------------
Third. The issue of fact is whether the price fixing 
agreement is motivated by any purpose other than to sti-
fle competition and has any other effect, or to put it an-
other way, whether the agreement results in "substan-
tial efficiencies." The issue of law is whether, notwith-
standing claims of procompetitive justifications for a 
price fixing agreement, the agreement is nonetheless per 
se unlawful. 
I am not sure which of these factual issues-if any-Jus-
TICE POWELL intends the District Court to try on remand. I 
get the impression from his memorandum that the District 
Court should collect general information about the health in-
surance (or health care) indus~ry and decide what rule of law 
is appropriate to that industry. Even if this disposition 
were consonant with the judicial rather than the legislative 
function, and I strongly believe that it is not, it does not sim-
ply defer to another day the question whether the per se rule 
operates in this industry. Given the procedural posture of 
this case, implicit in a remand for a trial of any of the factual 
issues that have been advanced is a resolution of the legal 
issue corresponding to the factual issue. 1 Any such implicit 
holding would represent a major shift in the substantive law 
of antitrust. 
In this memorandum, I will address separately these issues 
oflaw. In section IV, I will address an additional legal argu-
1 This is true because on a motion for summary judgment we must as-
sume that the nonmovant would be able to prove all allegations that are 
fairly controverted. We would deny the motion only if this proof would be 
sufficient to avoid the application of the per se rule. 
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ment about which there would seem to be no genuine issue of 
fact: whether the price fixing agreement in this case fits into 
the holding of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, i. e., whether the record dis-
closes price fixing in only a technical or literal sense. 
I 
One reason for remanding for a trial might be to determine 
whether the agreement among doctors to charge certain cus-
tomers no more than a fixed price is in fact a device to fix the 
actual price that will be charged by the participating doctors. 
The theory of such a remand would be that a horizontal 
agreement to fix maximum prices is legally distinguishable 
from an agreement to fix minimum or uniform prices. 
As an original proposition, reasonable men might differ on 
whether maximum price fixing agreements should be unlaw-
ful. Frank Easterbrook has written a persuasive article 
supporting the position that maximum price fixing should not 
be considered illegal per se, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 886 (1981), whereas an equally conservative 
antitrust expert-William F. Baxter-has signed the Solici-
tor General's brief arguing the contrary position, Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae 12-15. No matter how 
we might resolve that question on a clean slate, however, it is 
now hornbi)ok law that ~ ~onspiracyto fix maximum priq__es is 
subject to the same er se rule as a conspiracy to set uniform 
or minimum prices. 2 
- -=------
2 In his hornbook Professor Sullivan has this to say on the subject: 
"The policy which insists on individual decisions about price thus has at 
its source more than a preference for the independence of the small busi-
nessman (though that is surely there) and more than a preference for the 
lower prices which such a policy will usually yield to consumers (though 
that too is strongly present). Also at work is the theoretical conviction 
that the most general function of the competitive process, the allocation 
and reallocation of resources in a rational yet automatic manner, can be 
carried out only if independence by each trader is scrupulously required. 
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The statement of the rule in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons,3 Albrecht v. Herald Co.,4 and United 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 5 is unequivocal. More-
over, I think everyone would agree that a horizontal maxi-
Created out of the confluence of these parallel strivings, the policy has a 
breadth which makes it as forbidding to maximum price arrangements as 
to the more common ones which forestall price decreases." L. Sullivan, 
Antitrust 212 (1977). 
3 ''The Court of Appeals erred in holding that ~-
petitors to fix maximum resale prices of their products does not violate the 
Sherman Act. For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum 
prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to 
sell in accordance with their own judgment. We reaffirm what we said in 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223: 'Under the 
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of 
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity 
in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.'" 340 U. S. 211, 213. 
'"We think Kiefer-Stewart was correctly decided and we adhere to it. 
Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences in 
many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the 
perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive 
market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and 
survive in that market. Competition, even in a single product, is not cast 
in a single mold. Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to 
furnish services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer 
or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for 
which they are willing to pay. Maximum price fixing may channel distri-
bution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers who other-
wise would be subject to significant nonprice competition. Moreover, if 
the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always 
the fixed maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the maximum 
price approaches the actual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire 
all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices.'' 390 U. S. 
145, 152-153 (footnote omitted). 
5 In addition to the language quoted in Kiefer-Stewart, see n. 4, supra, 
the Court in Socony-Vacuum stated: 
"Proof that a combination was formed for the purpose of fixing prices and 
that it caused them to be fixed or contributed to that result is proof of the 
completion of a price-fixing conspiracy under § 1 of the Act.'' 310 U. S. 
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mum price fixing agreement is less defensible than a vertical 
maximum price fixing agreement. 6 It necessarily follows 
that if we were to accept the Easterbrook position, we would 
be required to repudiate a rule that has been accepted since it 
was first announced in Socony-Vacuum in 1940 and that has 
been reaffirmed unequivocally thereafter. 7 
Although I have always believed that Congress intended 
the Court to have broader discretion in interpreting the gen-
eral language of the Sherman Act than it has in construing 
most other statutes, it seems to me that this rule is so well 
150, 224 (footnote 59 omitted). 
In footnote 59 the Court added: 
"Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may 
be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reason-
ableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat 
to the central nervous system of the economy." Id., at 224 n. 59. 
6 See Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 886, 890, 
n. 20 (1981), and sources cited therein. Everyone, that is, except the re-
spondents, which distinguish Keifer-Stewart and Albrecht in part on the 
ground that the primary maximum price fixing agreements in those cases 
arose in the vertical context. See Brief for Respondents 41. 
7 "It has long been established that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful 
per se." Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647. The 
per se rule has been applied to an agreement among competitors to fix 
prices, see, e. g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392; 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, as well as 
to an agreement between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or retailer to fix 
resale prices, see, e. g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co., 220 U. S. 373. The law has not distinguished between minimum and 
maximum price fixing, see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145; Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211, or between the fixing of 
selling prices and the fixing of buying prices, see, e. g., Mandeville Island 
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219; American To-
bacco Co . v. United States, 328 U. S. 781. "Under the Sherman Act a 
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depress-
ing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or 
foreign commerce is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223. 
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settled that the doctrine of stare decisis should foreclose its 
reexamination unless Congress undertakes to amend the 
statute. 
JUSTICE POWELL describes as one of the justifications of-
fered by the respondents the fact that the price fixing agree-
ments in this case set only maximum fees. Ante, at 6. I do 
not, however, understand what significance, if any, the re-
mainder of his memorandum attaches to this point. 8 Putting 
the thought somewhat differently, I believe JUSTICE Pow-
ELL'S conclusion would be the same even if the petitioner 
proved that all or substantially all doctors in fact charged the 
maximum prices and that the effect of the price fixing was to 
set the actual market price-and not just the maximum 
price-by agreement among competitors. 
If the Court were to overrule Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht, 
and to hold that a horizontal agreement to fix maximum 
prices is not illegal per se, the issue to be tried on remand 
would be whether the doctors' agreement to fix maximum 
prices is tantamount to an agreement to fix actual prices. 9 
If the Court does not overrule those cases, there would seem 
to be no reason to try that issue. Moreover, under the anal-
ysis in JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum, even if the peti-
tioner prevailed on that factual question, it would not neces-
8 JUSTICE PoWEL'L does attempt to distinguish this case from Keifer-
Stewart and Albrecht on the basis of the "presence [in this case] of articu- I -? 
lated and unrebutted efficiency justifications." Ante, at 14, n. 16. This I 
distinction surely does not apply to Albrecht. See the dissenting opinions 
of Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart, and the Court's response thereto, 
390 U. S. 145, 151, n. 7. 
9 See Easterbrook, supra, at 891 ("It is possible that the maximum price 
agreement is a disguise for a more traditional cartel, in which event the 
agreement should be held unlawful."). The record leaves little doubt 
about the resolution of that issue. The administrator of the Maricopa 
foundation estimated that only 5 to 15 percent of the bills submitted to the 
foundation were lower than the maximum reimbursable price. See Depo-
sition of Anthony D. Mitten, Vol. II, p. 86; 643 F. 2d 553, 555 (CA9 1980). 
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sarily establish that the doctors' price fixing agreement is 
unlawful. 
II 
Judge Sneed's reason for ordering a trial is the easiest to 
refute; neither the respondents nor JUSTICE POWELL em-
braces it. Judge Sneed would uphold the price fixing agree-
ment if it resulted in lower prices than would prevail under 
purely competitive conditions. 10 This formulation of the fac-
tual issue to be tried is the economic equivalent of the argu-
ment made in earlier cases that horizontal price fixing was 
not unlawful if the fixed price was "reasonable." That argu-
ment was considered and firmly rejected in our first price fix-
ing case, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 
U. S. 290. 11 Cf. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 
10 "Perforce we must take industry as it exists, absent the challenged fea-
ture, as our baseline for measuring anticompetitive impact. The relevant 
inquiry becomes whether fees paid to doctors under that system would be 
less than those payable under the FMC maximum fee agreement. Put dif-
ferently, confronted with an industry widely deviant from a reasonably 
free competitive model, such as agriculture, the proper inquiry is whether 
the practice enhances the prices charged for the services. In simplified 
economic terms, the issue is whether the maximum fee arrangement better 
permits the attainment of the monopolist's goal, viz., the matching of mar-
ginal cost to marginal revenue, or in fact obstructs that end." 643 F. 2d 
553, 556 (CA9 1980). 
11 The Trans-Missouri case was decided on the pleadings. The Court 
held that the averments in the defendants' answer were insufficient as a 
matter of law. In the answer the defendants had alleged "that the object 
of the association at all times had been and was to establish all rates, rules, 
and regulations upon a just and reasonable basis." 166 U. S. 290, 304. 
They denied "that shippers or the public were in any way oppressed or in-
jured by reason of the rates fixed by the association, but on the contrary 
they alleged that the agreement and the association established under it 
had been beneficial to the patrons of the railway lines composing the associ-
ation and the public at large." Ibid. At page 341, the Court stated: 
"Although the case is heard on bill and answer, thus making it necessary 
to assume the truth of the allegations in the answer which are well pleaded, 
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85 F. 271, 283--284 (CA61898), aff'd, 175 U. S. 211. 12 In Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, we 
referred to Judge Taft's "classic rejection of the argument 
that competitors may lawfully agree to sell their goods at the 
same price as long as the agreed-upon price is reasonable." 
435 U. S. 679, 689. In our latest price fixing case, we reit-
erated the point: "It is no excuse that the prices fixed are 
themselves reasonable." Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 
Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647. As far as I can determine, the no-
tion that a price fixing agreement is lawful if the agreed-upon 
prices are "reasonable" is not considered acceptable by any 
current scholars. 13 
yet the legal effect of the agreement itself cannot be altered by the answer, 
not can its violation oflaw be made valid by allegations of good intention or 
of desire to simply maintain reasonable rates .... " 
'
2 "[T]here are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as we conceive, 
the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining the un-
reasonableness of restraints of trade, have set sail on a sea of doubt, and 
have assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts which have no other 
purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual restraint 
of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public interest, 
and how much is not." 
13 The hazards of inquiring into the reasonableness of the fixed prices are 
illustrated by this case. Even assuming that the price fixing agreement 
actually performs as a cost containment device, it is wrong to assume that 
lower prices are necessarily better than higher prices. Consumers of 
medical services are interested in other variables besides cost. An artifi-
cially low price, even if altruistically fixed, theoretically will restrict output 
of medical services. And the quality of medical services seems to be sub-
ordinated to price containment (or enhancement) objectives when, as here, 
the price fixing agreement does not account for the differences in skill, ex-
perience, and training of individual doctors or for the unusual simplicity or 
complexity of a particular case. See Rahl, Price Competition and the 
Price Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 137, 142 
(1962) ("Those who find it difficult to accept a per se rule when applied to 
an agreement to hold prices down miss the point to the rule. The rule is 
grounded on faith in price competition as a market force. It is not 
grounded on a policy of low selling prices at the price of eliminating 
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ARIZONA v. MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY 9 
Although JUSTICE POWELL avoids giving this theory any 
approval or placing any reliance upon it, his memorandum 
does not repudiate it. If the Court decides to remand this 
case, I would hope that its opinion would expressly repudiate 
the Court of Appeals' rationale and make it clear that the re-
mand is not for the purpose of deciding whether the prices 
fixed by the respondents were "reasonable." 
III 
JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum ~t endorse the 
Easterbrook position that horizontal agreements fixing maxi-
mum prices are to be tested by a different rule than minimum 
or uniform price fixing agreements, and also does not endorse 
Judge Sneed's arcane notion that price fixing is lawful if the 
fixed price is reasonable. The memorandum also correctly 
avoids suggesting that the doctors are exempt from the Sher-
man Act eit:her because of their profession 14 or because of 
their relationship with the insurance business. 15 The theory 
that JUSTICE POWELL does endorse, as I understand 1t, aE-
plies o all forms of horizontal price fixing agreements. The 
impact o the tlieory-1 it becomes t e rationale for a Court 
opinion-is just as extensive as the rule against price fixing 
itself. This case, in short, is one of major importance. 16 
competition."). 
"The Court has been cautious about applying antitrust principles to the 
professions in the same manner that they have been applied to other indus-
tries. See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 
435 U. S. 679, 696; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 788 
n. 17. But the respondents do not allege that there is any professional 
motivation for the price fixing agreement. Rather, they allege that the 
agreement is justified because it is part of a package for financing health 
care. The professions have no more license than any business to fix prices 
for services in order to make it more convenient for their customers to pay. 
1
• Respondents' McCarran-Ferguson Act defense was denied by the Dis-
trict Court, and that issue is not now before us. See ante, at 4 n. 7. 
16 It is noteworthy that the District Court concluded that the rule of rea-
son applies for two reasons: first, a profession is involved; and second, "a 
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A 
As I read the memorandum, the plaintiff must shoulder the 
burden of disproving any possible motivation for the price 
fixing other than a purpose to restrain competition. Jus-
TICE POWELL is quite correct in pointing out that in several 
of our opinions we have described agreements that are illegal 
per se as having "no purpose except stifling of competition." 
Ante, at 8; see, e.g., United States v. Topco, 405 U. S. 596, 
608. He is not correct, however, when he implies that those 
cases hold that no price fixing agreement deserves per se con-
demnation unless it is first established that there is no other 
justification for it. Two quotations from JUSTICE POWELL'S 
memorandum will illustrate my point. At page 8, he states: 
"Before deciding whether to characterize an arrange-
ment as a 'price fixing' agreement that deserves per se 
condemnation, a court must determine whether it is a 
'naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except sti-
fling of competition.' United States v. Topco Asso-
ciates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 608 (1972), quoting White 
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253, 263 (1963)." 
And at page 10, the memorandum states: 
"Only if it is clear that the agreement among physicians 
is 'so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of 
the industry is needed to establish [its] illegality' may we 
assign the label of per se invalidity. National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States, supra, 35 
U. S., at 692." 
The first quotation does not fairly characterize Topco. 17 
Indeed, in that case the Court strongly reaffirmed the "rigid" 
recent antitrust trend appears to be emerging where the Rule of Reason is 
the preferred method of determining whether a particular practice is in vi-
olation of the antitrust law." App. to Pet. for Cert. 43. 
11 And it surely does not fairly characterize White Motor Co. v. United 
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application of the per se rule, despite the possibility that prof-
fered efficiency justifications might survive close analysis. 
After noting that "[t]his Court has reiterated time and time 
again that '[h]orizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked 
restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of compe-
tition'" and are "per se violations of the Sherman Act," 405 
U. S., at 608, the Court stated: 
"We think that it is clear that the restraint in this case 
is a horizontal one, and, therefore, a per se violation of 
§ 1. The District Court failed to make any determina-
tion as to whether there were per se horizontal territo-
rial restraints in this case and simply applied a rule of 
reason in reaching its conclusions that the restraints 
were not illegal. In doing so, the District Court 
erred. 
"Whether or not we would decide this case the same 
under the rule of reason used by the District Court is ir-
relevant to the issue before us. The fact is that courts 
are of limited utility in examining difficult economic 
problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful 
sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the 
economy against promotion of competition in another 
sector is one important reason we have formulated per se 
rules. 
"In applying these rigid rules, the Court has consis-
tently rejected the notion that naked restraints of trade 
States, 372 U. S. 253. In that case, the Court held that the lawfulness of 
the vertical territorial and customer limitations could not be determined on 
summary judgment. But the Court's caution did not extend to the price-
fixing aspects of the case. According to the Court, "[p]rice-fixing arrange-
ments, both vertical and horizontal, have ... been held to be per se viola-
tions of the antitrust laws; and a trial to show their nature, extent, and 
degree is no longer necessary." Id., at 260 (citations omitted). 
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are to be tolerated because they are well intended or be-
cause they are allegedly developed to increase compe-
tition." Id., at 608-610 (footnote omitted). 18 
The second quotation, this one from Professional Engi- r? 
neers, is taken out of context. The context is made clear by 
a full quot~ 
"There are, thus, two complementary categories of 
antitrust analysis. In the first category are agreements 
whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anti-
competitive that no elaborate study of the industry is 
needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal per 
se.' In the second category are agreements whose com-
petitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the 
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the re-
straint, and the reasons why it was imposed." 435 
U. S., at 692. 
This categorization does not mean that an agreement that has 
been deemed illegal per se, such as a horizontal price fixing 
agreement, must be "so plainly anticompetitive" as it is used 
in a particular industry before the Court will apply the per se 
18 The Court elaborated on the reason for the rigid application of the per 
se rule: 
"There have been tremendous departures from the notion of a free-en-
terprise system as it was originally conceived in this country. These de-
partures have been the product of congressional action and the will of the 
people. If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion 
of the economy for greater competition in another portion, this too is a de-
cision that must be made by Congress and not by private forces or by the 
courts. Private forces are too keenly aware of their own interests in mak-
ing such decisions and courts are ill-equipped and ill-situated for such deci-
sionmaking. To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing 
interests and the endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such 
decisions, and to make the delicate judgment on the relative values to soci-
ety of competitive areas of the economy, the judgment of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people is required." 405 U. S. 596, 611-612. 
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rule to that industry. It means just the contrary. Some 
types of agreements have been deemed to be "so plainly anti-
competitive" in general that the Court will refuse to consider 
whether such an agreement is nonetheless procompetitive in 
a particular context. 19 The per se rule against a particular 
type of restraint is derivative of a rule of reason analysis of 
that restraint; 20 once this Court concludes that such an analy-
sis will result in condemnation in most, if not all, cases, we 
indulge in a conclusive presumption of illegality in the form of 
a per se rule. 21 The possibility that a more focused rule of 
'
9 The Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, explained why the "per se rule is a valid and useful 
tool of antitrust policy and enforcement," id., at 8: 
" 'This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of re-
straints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the ben-
efit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly 
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of 
the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to deter-
mine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an in-
quiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.' Northern Pac. R. Co. 
v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958).'' Id., at 8, n. 11. 
For a thoughtful and brief discussion of the costs and benefits of rule of 
reason versus per se rule analysis of price fixing agreements, see F. 
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 438-443 
(1970). Professor Scherer's "opinion, shared by a majority of American 
economists concerned with antitrust policy, is that in the present legal 
framework the costs of implementing a rule of reason would exceed the 
benefits derived from considering each restrictive agreement on its merits 
and prohibiting only those which appear unreasonable.'' Id., at 440. 
20 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 476 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[P]roperly under-
stood, rule-of-reason analysis is not distinct from "per se" analysis. On the 
contrary, agreements that are illegal per se are merely a species within the 
broad category of agreements that unreasonably restrain trade; less proof 
is required to establish their illegality, but they nonetheless violate the 
basic rule of reason.''). 
21 "Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations 
about the social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability 
that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the se-
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reason analysis of a particular use of the restraint might yield 
a different result is no defense to the rule that is justified in 
its general application. Thus, in Topco the Court held that 
the per se rule was applicable "[ w ]hether or not we would de-
cide th[e] case the same way under the rule of reason." 405 
U. S., at 609. 
Of the types of restraints categorically forbidden, "[a] hori-
zontal agreement to fix prices is the archetypal example." 
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647. 
"Congress has not left with us the determination of whether 
or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, 
healthy or destructive. . . . Whatever may be its peculiar 
problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as 
price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uni-
form rule applicable to all industries alike." United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 221-222. 
JUSTICE POWELL'S disposition therefore is not justified by 
existing law: there is no support for the notion that this Court 
(much less a district court by our direction) decides on an in-
dustry-by-industry basis whether the per se rule against hori-
zontal price fixing is appropriate. But even if cases in which 
the Court has refused to apply the per se rule to a new type of 
restraint, see, e. g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U. S. 253, provide any support for this notion, surely the 
verity of those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive 
consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a 
per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently com-
mon or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify 
them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the busi-
ness community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial 
system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials, see Northern Pac. R. Co. 
v. United States, 356 U. S., at 5; United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 
405 U. S. 596, 609-610 (1972), but those advantages are not sufficient in 
themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all 
of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unin-
tended and undesirable rigidity in the law." Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 50, n. 16. 
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Court should simply decide that the rule of reason applies un-
til we obtain enough experience with horizontal price fixing 
agreements in the health insurance (or health care) industry. 
We should not leave that lawmaking task to the District 
Court in this case. 
Unfortunately, the theory of JUSTICE POWELL'S memoran-
dum is not logically limited to industries that have not previ-
ously been involved in antitrust litigation. JUSTICE Pow-
ELL'S reformulation of the per se rule against horizontal price 
fixing conspiracies would, I believe, allow the defendants to 
offer a defense of justification in almost every rice fixing 
situat10n. Cons1 er, or examp e, a possible minimum price 
fixing agreement among airlin.es in today's market situation. 
It seems to me that they could reasonably argue that uni-
formly administered prices would substantially facilitate the 
work of travel agents who must quote airline fares for a num-
ber of different airlines in a complicated transportation net-
work, and furthermore, that placing a floor on airline fares 
would save a number- of carriers from the substantial risk of 
bankruptcy with its attendant inconvenience and loss to 
members of the general public. Such proof would foreclose 
any claim that price fixing was merely a naked restraint with 
no purpose except the stifling of competition. If the theory 
of the memorandum is accepted, it seems rather clear that 
most price fixing cases in the future will be decided under 
some form of rule of reason analysis. 
B 
Even if the Court is uncomfortable with the per se rule 
against horizontal price fixing and is willing to reexamine its 
justifications, an analysis of the particular restraint in issue 
does not make this case a compelling one for such a major 
shift in antitrust law. 
JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum seems to assume that the 
insurance plans sponsored by the Arizona foundations offer 
the public "a unique combination of flexibility and complete 
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coverage." Ante, at 3. The "unique" feature is presumably 
the availability of a plan that "offers complete coverage of 
medical expenses but still permits an insured to choose any 
physician." Ante, at 4. 22 The characterization is somewhat 
misleading. Since only about 70 percent of the doctors in the 
relevant market are members of either foundation, the guar-
antee of complete coverage only applies when an insured 
chooses a physician in that 70 percent. If he elects to go to a 
non-foundation doctor, he may be required to pay a portion of 
the doctor's fee. I do not see how this percentage markedly 
differs from that available in most markets. Presumably, at 
least 70 percent of the doctors in areas covered under other 
programs charge no more than the fee that Blue Shield and 
other insurers are willing to reimburse in full. 23 Thus, as is 
true in Arizona, if an insured asks his doctor if the insurance 
coverage is complete, presumably in about 70 percent of the 
22 The respondents summarize the benefits of the foundation-endorsed 
plans: 
"In addition to free choice of physicians, the benefits to Foundation in-
sured patients include the possibility of lower insurance premiums (due to 
the savings insurers realize on payments to providers), assurance that if a 
Foundation provider member is used, the insured will not have to pay any 
difference between what the health care provider bills and what the insur-
ance will reimburse (less any deductible in the insurance plan) and knowl-
edge that the health care provider will be discouraged from performing un-
necessary treatment because a qualified peer will review the treatment 
performed to determine if it is medically necessary or appropriate. Thus 
the Foundations offer a health care service different from that which indi-
vidual physicians or individual insurers could separately provide to the 
public." Brief for Respondents 12-13. 
But see Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care 
Financing, 1978 Duke L.J. 303, 379 ("[T]he means are readily available for 
insurers to compete effectively in cost containment. This availability of 
alternative means of solving problems that FMCs purport to address 
means that the FMCs' alleged benefits are entitled to little weight in the 
balancing process."). 
23 See Brief for Respondents 42 n. 120. 
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cases the doctor will say yes and in about 30 percent of the 
cases he will say no. There is no reason to believe that it is 
more burdensome for an insured to ask the doctor if his fees 
are covered by the typical insurance plan 24 than to ask the 
doctor if he is a member of the foundation. 
There is a difference between typical insurance plans and 
the foundation-endorsed plans-the doctors, rather than the 
insurers, determine the maximum reimbursable fees. 25 Jus-
TICE POWELL states that "[i]t simply is not clear on the 
record before us that ... participation by physicians in the 
setting of maximum fees is not essential to the success of this 
type of medical insurance service." Ante, at 13. But if 
"this type of medical insurance service" is characterized by 
what JUSTICE POWELL sees as its "unique" aspects-com-
plete coverage and a choice of doctors-the preceding para-
graph makes it plain that price fixing is not necessary to the 
successful marketing of the package. Even if price fixing is 
desirable, it is not necessary that the doctors do the fixing. 26 
24 By typical insurance plans, I mean those plans in which the insurer 
agrees to reimburse the insured for customary and reasonable charges. 
This type of coverage "has become the most commonly used method of in-
surance reimbursement for physicians' services." Dyckman, Council on 
Wage and Price Stability, A Study of Physicians' Fees 27 (1978). 
25 This is not to suggest that typical insurance plans, such as Blue Shield 
plans, are not actually controlled by doctors. Indeed, the belief that they 
are has given rise to considerable antitrust litigation. See Bureau of Com-
petition, Federal Trade Commission, Medical Participation in Control of 
Blue Shield and Certain Other Open-Panel Medical Prepayment Plans 
(1979); Kass & Pautler, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Physician Control of Blue Shield Plans (1979); Horan & Nord, Appli-
cation of Antitrust Law to the Health Care Delivery System, 9 Cumber-
land L. Rev. 685, 710--711 (1979); Weller, Medicaid Boycotts and Other 
Maladies from Medical Monopolists: An Introduction to Antitrust Litiga-
tion and the Health Care Industry, 11 Clearinghouse Rev. 99, 104-105 
(1977). Of course, the price fixing allegations in those cases are one step 
removed from the open price fixing among competitors that has occurred in 
this case. 
25 According to an FTC staff report, "Until the mid-1960's, most Blue 
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The record indicates that in Arizona the state program for 
comprehensive medical and dental care of foster children is 
administered by the Maricopa foundation pursuant to a con-
tract under which the maximum fee schedule is prescribed by 
a state agency rather than by the doctors. 27 This program 
and the Blue Shield plan challenged in Group Life & Health 
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205,28 indicate 
that insurers are capable not only of fixing maximum reim-
bursable prices but also of obtaining binding agreements with 
Shield plans determined in advance how much to pay for particular proce-
dures and prepared fee schedules reflecting their determinations. Fee 
schedules are still used in approximately 25 percent of Blue Shield con-
tracts." Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Medical Par-
ticipation in Control of Blue Shield and Certain Other Open-Panel Medical 
Prepayment Plans 128 (1979). 
21 In that program, the foundation performs the so-called "peer review" 
function as well as the administrative function of paying the doctors' bills, 
so we may dismiss the notion that their performance of these functions 
under the challenged plans requires the doctors' price fixing agreements. 
28 The Court in Royal Drug did not reach the question of the legality of 
the challenged plan, 440 U. S. 205, 210, n. 5, for the issue before the Court 
was whether the defendants were exempt under the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act. In an amicus brief, the Department of Justice observed that the 
plans probably were legal: 
"As a general matter, ... antitrust principles would not preclude the of-
fering of prepaid health insurance programs that use insurer-provider 
agreements. For example, the pleadings in this case indicate that the 
Pharmacy Agreements are bilateral contracts for the purchase of goods 
and services by Blue Shield. Blue Shield has offered to purchase drugs 
and pharmacy services from any pharmacy that will accept acquisition cost 
plus $2.00. Unless respondents could establish that some conspiracy 
among pharmacies is at work the Pharmacy Agreements would not amount 
to 'price fixing.' Transactions at a set price, through a series of voluntary 
bilateral contracts, are not price fixing even though large numbers of sell-
ers of services may be involved." Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., O.T. 
1978, No. 77-952, pp. 10-11. 
In this case, it is undisputed that we have a "conspiracy among [doctors] at 
work." 
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providers guaranteeing the insured full reimbursement of a 
participating provider's fee. 29 In light of these examples, it 
is not surprising that nothing in the record even arguably 
supports the conclusion that this type of insurance program 
could not function if the schedules were set in a different 
way. 30 
29 In a memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment and 
permanent injunction, the State made this argument. See 2 App. 354, 
370-371. In a responsive memorandum, the respondents argued that this 
was a factual issue that was in dispute. See 2 App. 487. However, they 
offered no refutation to the State's evidence that insurance plans in which 
insurers fixed the maximum reimbursable fees and offered the plan to indi-
vidual providers existed. To avoid summary judgment, the respondents 
at that point could not merely rest on their factual allegations. 
The commentators also support the State's argument. See generally 
Havighurst, Health Insurers and Health-Care Costs, 5 Health Commun. 
Informatics 319 (1979); Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs, 1 J. 
Health Politics, Policy & Law 471 (1977); Havighurst, Professional Re-
straints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 Duke L.J. 303; 
Havighurst & Kissam, The Antitrust Implications of Relative Value Stud-
ies in Medicine, 4 J. Health Politics, Policy & Law 48 (1979); Kallstrom, 
Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the 
Sherman Act, 1978 Duke L.J. 645. 
30 One of the headings in the respondents' brief asserts that "medical 
foundation endorsed insurance plans are a unique product which cannot 
exist unless maximum reimbursement levels for the insurance are estab-
lished by medical foundations." Brief for Respondents 37. The only ex-
planation of this assertion is contained in the following paragraph: 
"As in Broadcast Music, as a practical matter it is impossible for an indi-
vidual insurer to negotiate with a large proportion of the physicians in a 
community to establish uniform standards for medical care and uniform de-
fined dollar limits for maximum reimbursement levels which would bind 
the treating physician. Foundation endorsed insurance is unique in guar-
anteeing to the insureds 100% payment of physicians' bills (after the pay-
ment of a deductible) for treatment from a large number of physicians in 
private practice in the community, and in providing this service through a 
number of insurers at competitive insurance premiums. It is something 
no individual doctor or insurer could do." Ibid. (footnotes omitted). 
This explanation, which is without citation to any evidence or authority ex-
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The best argument that can be made for having doctors fix 
the maximum prices is that doctors can do it more efficiently 
than insurers. This is Easterbrook's position, see Easter-
brook, supra, at 898, and it also seems to be JUSTICE Pow-
cept Broadcast Music, is wholly unsatisfactory. As is stated in the text, 
the "unique" benefits of this plan accrue under typical insurance plans that 
reimburse the insured for reasonable services at reasonable prices, as long 
as the insured asks the doctor whether his fees generally are fully reim-
bursable under the typical plan. The burden on the insured is the same 
under the typical plan and under the foundation-endorsed plan-he must 
ask the doctor one simple question. 
The only difference is that the doctor's assurance that his fees generally 
are fully reimbursable is not backed by a written contract; to that extent it 
is not "binding." See Havighurst, Health Insurers and Health-Care 
Costs, 5 Health Commun. Informatics 319, 327-328 (1979). The respond-
ents assert that it would be impractical for an insurer to enter into binding 
contracts with individual doctors. The assertion is refuted by the Arizona 
program for foster children and the Blue Shield plan challenged in Royal 
Drug. In any event, the impracticality argument seems overstated. 
Someone must canvass the doctors to determine what maximum prices 
would be high enough to attract sufficient numbers of individual doctors to 
sign up but low enough to make the insurance plan competitive. In this 
case that canvassing function is performed by the doctors comprising the 
foundation; the foundation then deals with the insurer. I do not under-
stand why the insurers could not bypass the foundation. Under the foun-
dation plan, each doctor looks at the maximum fee schedule fixed by his 
competitors and either joins or does not join the plan; the same process 
would occur if it were the insurer that offered the maximum fee schedule to 
each doctor. Even if there are several insurers in the market, it would not 
seem unduly burdensome for each doctor to accept or reject each of the in-
surers' schedules. 
In this regard, it is significant that the fees are set by a group that seems 
to have substantial market power in the market for medical services, and 
that there is competition among insurance companies in the sale of medical 
insurance. Three different carriers provide the Pima foundation medical 
coverage, and seven insurers underwrite the Maricopa foundation plans. 
The case would be quite different if there were one insurance company that 
agreed to reimburse medical costs up to a schedule that it set and the indi-
vidual doctors were then free to accept or reject the terms imposed by the 
company. Cf. Havighurst & Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment, 30 
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ELL'S position, see ante, at 13 and n. 15. But absent some 
type of horizontal integration, 31 this Court has never accepted 
the argument that the potential efficiencies of a particular 
price fixing agreement save the agreement from speedy con-
demnation. There is no reason to believe either that the effi-
ciency savings in having the doctors fix the maximum fees 
are substantial 32 or that they are more substantial than the 
procompetitive aspects advanced by defendants to justify 
other price fixing agreements. To hold that a remand is 
warranted in this case therefore necessarily undercuts the 
justifications for the per se rule in all its applications. 
Moreover, if the theory of JUSTICE POWELL'S memoran-
dum is accepted, I fail to see why it is necessary to remand 
the case before deciding that rule of reason analysis is permis-
New England J . Medicine 1298, 1304 (1979). As long as there is compe-
tition among the insurance companies, there is no reason to believe that 
they would have the kind of bargaining power against a monopoly of physi-
cians that would be significantly greater than would individual consumers 
of medical services. Given the competition among insurance companies, 
and a substantial monopoly agreement among doctors, the situation may be 
comparable to an industry in which a single union sets wage levels through-
out the country in bargaining with competing employers. 
31 The relevant market for purposes of antitrust analysis is the market for 
medical services, not the market for health insurance. In the market for 
medical services, the physicians must be considered competitors of one an-
other. That would not, of course, be true of competitiors who become 
partners or participants in some other form of joint venture in which they 
pool capital and share the risks of loss and the opportunities for profit. In 
such an arrangement, the doctors could of course agree on the fees that 
would be charged just as partners in a law firm may agree upon the fees to 
be charged. We are concerned, not with such partnerships, but rather 
with agreements among independent entrepreneurs who do not contribute 
to the performance of services by their competitors in any way except by 
agreeing on the maximum fee that they will charge insured patients. The 
price fixing agreement is therefore not "ancillary" to any agreement among 
the doctors concerning the way in which they will perform medical 
services. 
32 See n. 30 supra. 
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sible. The respondents quite obviously intend to offer evi-
dence of their good motives, evidence that the foundation 
plans are desirable, and evidence that price fixing by doctors 
yields substantial efficiencies. Although I question the per- · 
suasiveness of that evidence, I see no reason for postponing 
the decision of the question concerning its legal relevance un-
til after a trial. On a motion for summary judgment, we can 
and must give the respondents every benefit of the doubt on 
their allegations. But in my judgment there is no legal dif-
ference between justifying a price fixing agreement among 
competitors on the ground that they have fixed reasonable 
prices for their services---i. e., the Judge Sneed approach-
and justifying price fixing on the ground that the agreement 
makes it possible to develop more reasonable insurance rates 
for medical coverage than could be obtained in a free market. 
IV 
One of the surface complexities of this case derives from 
the fact that the doctors' agreement about the prices they 
will charge certain insured customers is an aspect of the pro-
vision of insurance. There is a sneaking sense that the price 
fixing agreement is ancillary to the legitimate transaction of 
offering an insurance package to the public. On analysis, 
however, this sense becomes nonsense. The respondent 
foundations are groups of doctors. They do not sell insur-
ance, either jointly or separately, and they derive no revenue 
from the sale of health insurance policies. They sell medical 
services. Their combination has merely permitted them to 
sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and ar-
guably to affect the prevailing market price of medical care. 
It is this misunderstanding that leads the respondents to 
argue that the price fixing aspect of the insurance package is 
similar to the price fixing aspect of the blanket license in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., 441 U. S. 1. Broadcast Music did not in any way de-
part from established law concerning price fixing and it pro-
vides no support for the respondents' position. 
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If company A manufactures knives, company B forks, and 
company C makes spoons, they might agree to use a common 
agent to sell sets of knives, forks, and spoons. In a literal 
sense, such a joint marketing program might be a price fixing 
agreement, but since a set of all three items is more market-
able than any of the three separate components, and assum-
ing that there is little or no competition among manufactur-
ers of the separate items, their agreement would not be a 
typical horizontal price fixing agreement among competitors. 
Broadcast Music involved a similar arrangement. The 
blanket license was a much more marketable product than 
any individual composition, since a single composition was of 
little use to the typical buyer of music. Moreover, the blan-
ket license was a product-the right to use copyrighted com-
positions derived from the entire membership of ASCAP-
that was entirely different from the product that any one 
composer was able to sell by himself. 33 A "necessary conse-
quence" of the creation of this new product was that its price 
had to be established. Id., at 21. But the delegation by the 
composers to ASCAP of the power to fix the price for that 
product did not place any restraint on the right of any indi-
vidual copyright owner to sell his own compositions sepa-
rately to any buyer at any price. 34 Furthermore, there was 
little competition among individual composers for their sepa-
33 "Thus, to the extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP 
is not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of many sell-
ers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the indi-
vidual compositions are raw material." 441 U. S. 1, 22 (footnote omitted). 
34 "Here, the blanket-license fee is not set by competition among individ-
ual copyright owners, and it is a fee for the use of any of the compositions 
covered by the license. But the blanket license cannot be wholly equated 
with a simple horizontal arrangement among competitors. ASCAP does 
set the price for its blanket license, but that license is quite different from 
anything any individual owner could issue. The individual composers and 
authors have neither agreed not to sell individually in any other market nor 
use the blanket license to mask price fixing in such other markets." Id., at 
23-24 (footnote omitted). 
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rate compositions. For these reasons, in Broadcast Music 
the Court held that the blanket license was not a species of 
price fixing categorically forbidden by the Sherman Act. In 
essence, the Court held that the record disclosed price fixing 
only in a "literal sense." Id., at 8. 35 
This case is fundamentally different. The only product 
that individual doctors have to sell is their individual serv-
ices. Their combination in the form of the foundation does 
not permit them to sell any different product. Their com-
bination does permit them to sell something intangible-the 
promise that all members of the foundation will sell their 
services to certain insureds at fixed prices-and it is quite 
true that no individual member could sell that "product" sep-
arately. But the "product" is nothing more than the price 
fixing agreement; the price fixing agreement does not itself 
permit the foundation to sell a legitimate product that the in-
dividual doctors could not sell separately. 
The agreement under attack is an agreement among hun-
dreds of separate entrepreneurs 36 concerning the price at 
which each will offer his own services to a substantial number 
of consumers. It is true that some are surgeons, some an-
esthesiologists, and some psychiatrists, but unlike the knife-
fork-spoon example, the doctors do not sell a package of three 
kinds of services and their price fixing involves an agreement 
among competing surgeons, competing psychiatrists, and 
competing anesthesiologists. The analogy to Broadcast 
Music would be appropriate if a group of doctors entered into 
an arrangement to market their medical services as a pack-
age. If a clinic offered complete medical coverage for a flat 
fee, the cooperating doctors would have the type of partner-
35 It is therefore not correct to interpret the Court's holding in Broadcast 
Music as approving horizontal price fixing whenever the arrangement 
yields "substantial efficiencies." Ante, at 9. 
35 There are about 1750 active members of the Maricopa foundation and 
about 400 members of the Pima foundation. 1 App. 74; 2 App. 407. 
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ship arrangement in which a price fixing agreement among 
the doctors would be perfectly proper. For they would pool 
their capital and share the risks of loss and the opportunities 
for profit. But the fee agreements disclosed by the record in 
this case are among independent competing entrepreneurs. 
They fit squarely into the classical horizontal price fixing 
mold. 37 
V 
Although there is nothing in the record to support the no-
tion that the foundation-endorsed insurance plans confer spe-
cial benefits on consumers, the oral argument on behalf of the 
respondents apparently created that impression. If that 
were the case, one would suppose that the State of Arizona 
would be defending these programs instead of challenging 
them. Indeed, it is of some interest that the 40 States that 
have filed amicus curiae briefs, as well as the United States, 
are unanimous in their opposition to this form of setting re-
imbursement schedules for physicians. Indeed, the orga-
nizations representing consumers of medical services-the 
American Association of Retired Persons and the National 
37 Indeed, one commentator has observed that "[c]ombined physician-
competitor action to fix the level of reimbursement fees, even if imposing 
maximum limits, appears much closer to per se price fixing than either 
Catalano's agreement to eliminate credit, or Professional Engineers' ethi-
cal ban on price competition in bidding." Halper, The Health Care Indus-
try and the Antitrust Laws: Collision Course?, 49 Antitrust L.J. 17, 28 
(1980). He also noted that "the Court's BMI case seems inapposite." 
Ibid. (footnote omitted). In that regard, it is significant that the Depart-
ment of Justice in this case is of the view that the arrangement among the 
doctors is distinguishable from the blanket license of Broadcast Music and 
is forbidden by the antitrust laws. In Broadcast Music the Court pointed 
out that the Department of Justice had recognized that "'some kind of cen-
tral licensing agency by which copyright holders may offer their works in a 
common pool to all who wish to use them"' was an essential mechanism for 
marketing music rights. See 441 U. S. 1, 14. There is no suggestion that 
there is any need for a common marketing agent for medical services unless 
the doctors elect to form some sort of a partnership arrangement. 
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Retired Teachers Association-are of the same view. It 
seems somewhat fanciful to me to assume that all these doc-
tors are spending so much time and energy in an industry-
wide, fee-setting program simply to benefit their customers 
without any of their customers being aware of the good deeds 
that they are performing. 
The more I study this case, the more firmly I become con-
vinced that we should reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals largely for the reasons stated in Judge Larson's dis-
senting opinion. What I have set forth above will be sub-
stantially rewritten if it must be converted into a dissenting 
opinion. 
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j;np-rmtt C!}o-url ttf tfrt ~h .itattS' 
'Jfiullpngtir~ J. cq. 2.0ffeJ!., 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. March 31, 1982 
RE: No. 80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical 
Society, et al. 
Dear John: 
I agree and will join if it becomes an opinion. 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/ 
lfp/ss 04/01/82 Rider A, p. 15 (Maricopa) 
MAR15 SALLY-POW 
* * * * * 
In light of John's long and thoughtful 
memorandum, I add these observation. The case is here on 
a motion for summary judgment made by the state, a motion 
infrequently appropriate for the resolution of an 
antitrust case - especially one with the unusual facts of 
this case. As John notes, however, (p. 22 his memo), on a 
summary judgment motion, we "must give the respondents 
every benefit of the doubt on their allegations". John 
also concedes that factual issues exist. Our disagreement 
is whether they are material, and whether - on a fully 
developed record - these and other relevant facts may not 
shed controlling light on how this case should be decided. 
2. 
The case does present a very different situation from the 
conventional commercial antitrust case. As John states: 
"This case, in short, is one of major importance." 
Memorandum, p. 9. In my view, it deserves the type of 
thorough considertion that only a trial can ensure. 
lfp/ss 04/01/82 Revision of Note 15, p. 13 (Maricopa) 
MAR15A SALLY-POW 
Justice Stevens suggests that the approach of 
this memorandum would save an airline cartel's minimum 
price agreement from per se condemnation. Memorandum, 15. 
This hypothetical is wholly irrelevant, but it does 
illustrate the difference between our two approaches to 
this case. The airline cartel example is the textbook per 
se violation, particularly because it would foreclose all 
competition in the relevant market. It also involves 
price fixing of substantially identical services: 
transportation by air from one point to another. This 
case presents no comparable situation. As noted 
previously, supra n. ---, the service of physicians is 
not fungible. Moreover, the triparte arrangement before 
2. 
us in this case leaves room for substantial competition. 
There are scores of insurance companies that write health 
insurance, and only eight of these presently have 
contracts with FMC. Although about 70% of the doctors in 
Maricopa County were members of FMC, membership is on a 
yearly basis. None is obligated to renew membership. The 
FMC serves only those insurers and physicians who elect to 
use it it. The brokerage function performed for the 
insurers, as noted above, is claimed to embody 
efficiencies that result in lower insurance premiums. In 
sum, on the record before us it is wholly unrealistic to 
compare this medical service program with an airline 
cartel or indeed with any conventional horizontal price 
fixing agreement previously before this Court. 
lfp/ss 04/01/82 Rider A, p. 11 (Maricopa) 
MARllA SALLY-POW 
John: I suggest the following revision of present n. 13. 
In this respect, it is relevant to note that FMC 
member physicians accept detriments as well as benefits. 
Medical service, unlike most commercial products, is not 
fungible. Nor is price (i.e. a physician's charges) 
usually a determinative factor in one's choice of 
physician. Thus, the level of competition among 
physicians in Maricopa County - as elsewhere in the 
medical profession - relates more to reputation, personal 
friendships, or even convenience, than to "price". 
Because of complications and other widely varying 
circumstances peculiar to the patient, charges higher than 
the FMC maximum charges often would be customary and 
~· 
2. 
proper. Physicians who become members forego this 
opportunity. Thus, the integration of functions between 
FMC physicians and insurers accomplished through this 
health benefit plan involves shared benefits and risks. 
John: Although I am not implying that physicians are not 
subject to the antitrust laws, the more I think about this 
case the less relevant the typical commerical antitrust 
case becomes. But take a close look at my recasting of 
this note. I am not sure that I have it exactly right. 
As indicated with respect to your suggested new sentence 
to be added at the end of present note 13, I really don't 
understand the point you are making. Perhaps you could 
reframe it. 
lfp/ss 04/01/82 Rider A, p. 11 (Maricoa) 
MARll SALLY-POW 
Justice Stevens repeatedly states that 
"horizontal price fixing" agreements and "naked 
restraints" on trade are illegal per se. Of course, as 
our cases have so held. But the relevant question is when 
these results-determinative characterizations properly may 
be made. In effect, these are judgment that decide a 
case. It is premature to make them as this time. This 
case has not been tried. It is before us on a limited 
record, follwoing a cetfified appeal after the District 
Court denied petitioner's summary judgment motion. In this 




Justice Stevens does reject, as required by 
Broadast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 
Inc., 441 U.S. 9, a literal test banning all agreements 
among competitors that set prices. Memorandum, p. 21, n. 
31, and p. 22-25. But he reads the cases differently. In 
my view, they require consderation of whether the 
challenged arrangements yields pro-competitive and 
otherwise unattainable economies before us determining 
whether the record supports the fatal "naked restraint" or 
"price fixing" characterization. See id., at 24, n. 35. 
As I understand Justice Stevens' memorandum, he ~ ~ 
proposes a two-part test. This test inquires, first, 
whether the challenged arrangements yields a "more 
marketable" product and, second, whether there was "little 
or no competition" among the parties before their entry 
3. 
into the agreement or program at issue. The first 
component of this test simply restates a part of the 
inquiry that is familiar in our cases: whether the 
challenged arrangement achieves cost savings that make the 
resulting product more attractive to consumers. At this 
stage in the present case, we must assume that the 
insurance companies - eight in number that are competing 
among themselves - believe that the FMC's do effect cost 
savings that make this health insurance arrangement 
peculiarly attractive to consumers. Seep. 4 and n. 5, 
supra. 
With respect to the second component of Justice 
Stevens' test (whether there was "little or no 
competition"), his positions appear inconsistent. Without 
citation of authority, he relies upon this component as 
4. 
the only plausible means of distinguishing Broadcast 
Music, Inc. Memorandum, 23-24. On the other hand, he 
concedes (as he must, see id., at 9) that "of course ... 
competitors" such as lawyers and physicians largely may 
set prices by entering partnerships. Id., 21, n. 31 
(emphasis added). See also id., at 24-25. Indeed, the 
size of some law firms are commencing to rival the number 
of physicians that would join an FMC. I therefore find 
unpersuasive, and also unprecedented, the test proposed by 
Justice Stevens for distinguishing Broadcast Music, and 
determining the appropriateness of per se labels. 
Justice Stevens is correct, of course, in noting 
that the reasonableness of a price level alone is not a 
valid antitrust defense. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target 
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 647; National Society of 
5. 
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 689. 
But weighing the pro-competitive efficiencies of an 
innovative arrangement is not to be equated to an inquiry 
into the "reasonableness" of a price fixing scheme. 
Note to John: I have redictated the foreoing primarily to 
make it more easily understood by nonexperts in these 
moore arcane aspects of antitrust - of whom I am one. 
Please look critically at what I have written, and ask 
David also to take a look. I am not at all sure that this 
response to Stevens in strengthened by the third and 




TO: John DATE: April 26, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa 
Take a look at the brief in 81-398 Union Life, at 
p. 14, et seq., with a discussion of Maricopa that mav be of 
interest. 
The Union Life Insurance Company case is to be 
argued this week. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.:§n:vrrntt <!Jo-url of tqt ~th jjtale.9' 
~fr:ngton. ~- QJ. 20ffeJ!.~ 
April 26, 1982 
Re: 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Medical Society 
Dear Lewis, 
I have spent considerable time on this 
case and have dee ided, contrary to my 
conference vote, that the Court of Appeals 
should be reversed. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
/ 
~ltJJrttttt (!lltUri of f!rt ~th .itait.&' 
~fiinghtn. ~- OJ. 20ffe~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
April 26, 1982 ~ 
Re: 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Medical Society 
Dear Lewis, 
I have spent considerable time on this 
case and have decided, contrary to my 
conference vote, that the Court of Appeals 
should be reversed. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:%irvrtnu> QJourt of tqt 'Jltnittb .:%taus 
'lllaslri:ngfon, ~. QJ. 2llp11~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 6, 1982 
Re: No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society 
Dear John: 
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From: Justice Stevens .. ... MAY 26 '82 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-419 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. MARICOPA COUNTY 
MEDICAL SOCIETY ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 1, has been violated by an agreement among 
competing physicians setting, by majority vote, the maxi-
mum fees that they may claim in full payment for health serv-
ices provided to policyholders of specified insurance plans. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the question could not be answered without eval-
uating the actual purpose and effect of the agreement at a full 
trial. 643 F. 2d 553 (1980). Because the undisputed facts 
disclose a violation of the statute, we granted certiorari, 450 
U. S. 979 (1981), and now reverse. 
I 
In October 1978 the State of Arizona filed a civil complaint 
against two county medical societies and two "foundations for 
medical care" that the medical societies had organized. The 
complaint alleged that the defendants were engaged in an il-
legal price fixing conspiracy. 1 After the defendants filed 
1 The complaint alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act as well as of 
the Arizona antitrust statute. The state statute is interpreted in confor-
mity with the federal statute. 643 F. 2d, at 554, n. 1. The State of Ari-
zona prayed for an injunction but did not ask for damages. 
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their answers, one of the medical societies was dismissed by 
consent, the parties conducted a limited amount of pretrial 
discovery, and the State moved for partial summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability. The District Court denied the 
motion,2 but entered an order pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1292(b), certifying for interlocutory appeal the question 
"whether the FMC membership agreements, which contain 
the promise to abide by maximum fee schedules, are illegal 
per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act." 3 
2 The District Court offered three reasons for its decision. First, citing 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977), the 
court stated that "a recent antitrust trend appears to be emerging where 
the Rule of Reason is the preferred method of determining whether a par-
ticular practice is in violation of the antitrust law." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
43. Second, "the two Supreme Court cases invalidating maximum price-
fixing, [Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951), and 
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968)], need not be read as estab-
lishing a per se rule." App. to Pet. for Cert. 44. Third, "a profession is 
involved here." Id., at 45. Under the rule of reason approach, the plain-
tiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue ofliability could not 
be granted "because there is insufficient evidence as to the [purpose and 
effect of the allegedly unlawful practices and the power of the defend-
ants.]" Id., at 47. 
The District Court also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss based 
on the ground that they were engaged in the business of insurance within 
the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39-41. The defendants did not appeal that por-
tion of the District Court order. 643 F. 2d, at 559 and n. 7. 
3 The quoted language is the Court of Appeals' phrasing of the question. 
643 F. 2d, at 554. The District Court had entered an order on June 5, 
1979, providing, in relevant part: 
"The plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liabil-
ity is denied with leave to file a similar motion based on additional evidence 
if appropriate." App. to Pet. for Cert. 48. 
On August 8, 1979, the District Court entered a further order providing: 
"The Order of this Court entered June 5, 1979 is amended by addition of 
the following: This Court's determination that the Rule of Reason approach 
should be used in analyzing the challenged conduct in the instant case to 
determine whether a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act has oc-
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The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, affirmed the Dis-
trict Court's order refusing to enter partial summary judg-
ment, but each of the three judges on the panel had a differ-
ent view of the case. Judge Sneed was persuaded that "the 
challenged practice is not a per se violation." 643 F. 2d, at 
560. 4 Judge Kennedy, although concurring, cautioned that 
he had not found "these reimbursement schedules to be per 
se proper, [or] that an examination of these practices under 
the rule of reason at trial will not reveal the proscribed ad-
verse effect on competition, or that this court is foreclosed at 
some later date, when it has more evidence, from concluding 
that such schedules do constitute per se violations." Ibid. 5 
curred involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from the Order denying 
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liablity may 
materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation. There-
fore, the foregoing Order and determination of the Court is certified for 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b)." Id., at 50-51. 
'Judge Sneed explained his reluctance to apply the per se rule substan-
tially as follows: The record did not indicate the actual purpose of the maxi-
mum fee arrangements or their effect on competition in the health care in-
dustry. It was not clear whether the assumptions made about typical 
price restraints could be carried over to that industry. Only recently had 
this Court applied the antitrust laws to the professions. Moreover, there 
already were such significant obstacles to pure competition in the industry 
that a court must compare the prices that obtain under the maximum fee 
arrangements with those that would otherwise prevail rather than with 
those that would prevail under ideal competitive conditions. Further-
more, the Ninth Circuit had not applied Keifer-Stewart, supra, and Al-
brecht, supra, to horizontal agreements that establish maximum prices; 
some of the economic assumptions underlying the rule against maximum 
price fixing were not sound. 
5Judge Kennedy's concurring opinion concluded as follows: 
"There does not now appear to be a controlling or definitive analysis of 
the market impact caused by the arrangements under scrutiny in this case, 
but trial may reveal that the arrangements are, at least in their essentials, 
not peculiar to the medical industry and that they should be condemned." 
643 F. 2d, at 560. 
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Judge Larson dissented, expressing the view that a per se 
rule should apply and, alternatively, that a rule of reason 
analysis should condemn the arrangement even if a per se ap-
proach was not warranted. Id., at 563-569. 6 
Because the ultimate question presented by the certiorari 
petition is whether a partial summary judgment should have 
been entered by the District Court, we must assume that the 
respondents' version of any disputed issue of fact is correct. 
We therefore first review the relevant undisputed facts and 
then identify the factual basis for the respondents' contention 
that their agreements on fee schedules are not unlawful. 
II 
The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care is a non-profit 
Arizona corporation composed of licensed doctors of medi-
cine, osteopathy, and podiatry engaged in private practice. 
Approximately 1,750 doctors, representing about 70% of the 
practitioners in Maricopa County, are members. 
The Maricopa foundation was organized in 1969 for the pur-
pose of promoting fee-for-service medicine and to provide the 
community with a competitive alternative to existing health 
insurance plans. 7 The foundation performs three primary 
•Judge Larson stated, in part: 
"Defendants formulated and dispersed relative value guides and conver-
sion factor lists which together were used to set an upper limit on fees re-
ceived from third-party payors. It is clear that these activities consti-
tuted maximum price-fixing by competitors. Disregarding any 'special 
industry' facts, this conduct is per se illegal. Precedent alone would man-
date application of the per se standard. 
"I find nothing in the nature of either the medical profession or the 
health care industry that would warrant their exemption from per se rules 
for price-fixing." Id ., at 56~64 (citations omitted). 
7 Most health insurance plans are of the fee-for-service type. Under the 
typical insurance plan, the insurer agrees with the insured to reimburse 
the insured for "usual, customary, and reasonable" medical charges. The 
third party insurer, and the insured to the extent of any excess charges, 
bears the economic risk that the insured will require medical treatment. 
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activities. It establishes the schedule of maximum fees that 
participating doctors agree to accept as payment in full for 
services performed for patients insured under plans ap-
proved by the foundation. It reviews the medical necessity 
and appropriateness of treatment provided by its members to 
such insured persons. It is authorized to draw checks on in-
surance company accounts to pay doctors for services per-
formed for covered patients. In performing these functions, 
the foundation is considered an "insurance administrator" by 
the Director of the Arizona Department of Insurance. Its 
participating doctors, however, have no financial interest in 
the operation of the foundation. 
The Pima Foundation for Medical Care, which includes 
about 400 member doctors, 8 performs similar functions. 
For the purposes of this litigation, the parties seem to regard 
the activities of the two foundations as essentially the same. 
No challenge is made to their peer review or claim adminis-
tration functions. Nor do the foundations allege that these 
two activities make it necessary for them to engage in the 
practice of establishing maximum fee schedules. 
At the time this lawsuit was filed, 9 each foundation made 
use of "relative values" and "conversion factors" in compiling 
An alternative to the fee-for-service type of insurance plan is illustrated by 
the health maintenance organizations authorized under the Health Mainte-
nance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U. S. C. § 300e et seq. Under this form 
of pre-paid health plan, the consumer pays a fixed periodic fee to a func-
tionally integrated group of doctors in exchange for the group's agreement 
to provide any medical treatment that the subscriber might need. The 
economic risk is thus borne by the doctors. 
8 The record contains divergent figures on the percentage of Pima 
County doctors that belong to the foundation. A 1975 publication of the 
foundation reported 80%; a 1978 affidavit by the executive director of the 
foundation reported 30%. 
9 In 1980, after the District Court and the Court of Appeals had ren-
dered judgment, both foundations apparently discontinued the use of rela-
tive values and conversion factors in formulating the fee schedules. More-
over, the Maricopa foundation that year amended its by-laws to provide 
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its fee schedule. The conversion factor is the dollar amount 
used to determine fees for a particular medical specialty. 
Thus, for example, the conversion factors for "medicine" and 
"laboratory" were $8.00 and $5.50, respectively, in 1972, and 
$10.00 and $6.50 in 1974. The relative value schedule pro-
vides a numerical weight for each different medical service--
thus, an office consultation has a lesser value than a home 
visit. The relative value was multiplied by the conversion 
factor to determine the maximum fee. The fee schedule has 
been revised periodically. The foundation board of trustees 
would solicit advice from various medical societies about the 
need for change in either relative values or conversion factors 
in their respective specialties. The board would then formu-
late the new fee schedule and submit it to the vote of the en-
tire membership. 10 
The fee schedules limit the amount that the member doc-
tors may recover for services performed for patients insured 
under plans approved by the foundations. To obtain this ap-
proval the insurers-including self-insured employers as well 
as insurance companies 11-agree to pay the doctors' charges 
that the fee schedule would be adopted by majority vote of its board of 
trustees and not by vote of its members. The challenge to the foundation 
actitivities as we have described them in the text, however, is not mooted 
by these changes. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629 
(1953). 
10 The parties disagree over whether the increases in the fee schedules 
are the cause or the result of the increases in the prevailing rate for medi-
cal services in the relevant markets. There appears to be agreement, 
however, that ~95% of physicians in Maricopa County bill at or above the 
maximum reimbursement levels set by the Maricopa foundation. 
11 Seven different insurance companies underwrite health insurance plans 
that have been approved by the Maricopa foundation, and three companies 
underwrite the plans approved by the Pima foundation. The record con-
tains no firm data on the portion of the health care market that is covered 
by these plans. The State relies upon a 1974 analysis indicating that the 
the insurance plans endorsed by the Maricopa foundation had about 63% of 
the prepaid health care market, but the respondents contest the accuracy 
of this analysis. 
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up to the scheduled amounts, and in exchange the doctors 
agree to accept those amounts as payment in full for their 
services. The doctors are free to charge higher fees to unin-
sured patients and they also may charge any patient less than 
the scheduled maxima. A patient who is insured by a foun-
dation-endorsed plan is guaranteed complete coverage for the 
full amount of his medical bills only if he is treated by a foun-
dation member. He is free to go to a nonmember physician 
and is still covered for charges that do not exceed the maxi-
mum fee schedule, but he must pay any excess that the non-
member physician may charge. 
The impact of the foundation fee schedules on medical fees 
and on insurance premiums is a matter of dispute. The 
State of Arizona contends that the periodic upward revisions 
of the maximum fee schedules have the effect of stabilizing 
and enhancing the level of actual charges by physicians, and 
that the increasing level of their fees in turn increases insur-
ance premiums. The foundations, on the other hand, argue 
that the schedules impose a meaningful limit on physicians' 
charges, and that the advance agreement by the doctors to 
accept the maxima enables the insurance carriers to limit and 
to calculate more efficiently the risks they underwrite and 
therefore serves as an effective cost containment mechanism 
that has saved patients and insurers millions of dollars. Al-
though the Attorneys General of 40 different States, as well 
as the Solicitor General of the United States and certain 
organizations representing consumers of medical services, 
have filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the State of Arizo-
na's position on the merits, we must assume that the re-
spondents' view of the genuine issues of fact is correct. 
This assumption presents, but does not answer, the ques-
tion whether the Sherman Act prohibits the competing doc-
tors from adopting, revising, and agreeing to use a maximum 
fee schedule in implementation of the insurance plans. 
III 
The respondents recognize that our decisions establish that 
price fixing agreements are unlawful on their face. But they 
,, 
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argue that the per se rule does not govern this case because 
the agreements at issue are horizontal and fix maximum 
prices, are among members of a profession, are in an industry 
with which the judiciary has little antitrust experience, and 
are alleged to have procompetitive justifications. Before we 
examine each of these arguments, we pause to consider the 
history and the meaning of the per se rule against price fixing 
agreements. 
A 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890 literally prohibits 
every agreement "in restraint of trade." 12 In United States 
v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505 (1898), we recognized 
that Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation 
of the word "every"; since Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. 
United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911), we have analyzed most re-
straints under the so-called "rule of reason." As its name 
suggests, the rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide 
whether under all the circumstances of the case the re-
strictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on 
competition. 13 
The elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a chal-
12 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. ... " 15 U. S. C. § 1. 
13 Justice Brandeis provided the classic statement of the rule of reason in 
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918): 
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it 
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that 
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the re-
straint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the rea-
son for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be 
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will 
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because 
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
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lenged business practice entails significant costs. Litigation 
of the effect or purpose of a practice often is extensive and 
complex. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 
1, 5 (1958). Judges often lack the expert understanding of 
industrial market structures and behavior to determine with 
any confidence a practice's effect on competition. United 
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 609-610 
(1972). And the result of the process in any given case may 
provide little certainty or guidance about the legality of a 
practice in another context. Id., at 609, n. 10; Northern 
Pac. R. Co. v. United States, supra, at 5. 
The costs of judging business practices under the rule of 
reason, however, have been reduced by the recognition of per 
se rules. 14 Once experience with a particular kind of re-
straint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the 
rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive pre-
sumption ·that the restraint is unreasonable. 16 As in every 
rule of general application, the match between the presumed 
and the actual is imperfect. For the sake of business cer-
tainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invali-
dation of some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might 
have proved to be reasonable. 16 
consequences." 
14 For a thoughtful and brief discussion of the costs and benefits of rule of 
reason versus per se rule analysis of price fixing agreements, see F. 
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 438-443 
(1970). Professor Scherer's "opinion, shared by a majority of American 
economists concerned with antitrust policy, is that in the present legal 
framework the costs of implementing a rule of reason would exceed the 
benefits derived from considering each restrictive agreement on its merits 
and prohibiting only those which appear unreasonable." Id., at 440. 
1
• "Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be 
unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group 
boycotts, and tying arrangements." Nonhern Pac. R. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958) (citations omitted). See United States v. Co-
lumbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 522-523 (1948). 
16 Thus, in applying the per se rule to invalidate the restrictive practice in 
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Thus the Court in Standard Oil recognized that inquiry 
under its rule of reason ended once a price fixing agreement 
was proved, for there was "a conclusive presumption which 
brought [such agreements] within the statute." 221 U. S., 
at 65. By 1927, the Court was able to state that "it has ... 
often been decided and always assumed that uniform price-
fixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade 
or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sher-
man Law." United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 
392, 398. 
"The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if 
effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. 
The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or 
not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbi-
trary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price 
fixed today may through economic and business changes 
become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once es-
tablished, it may be maintained unchanged because of 
the absence of competition secured by the agreement for 
a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which cre-
ate such potential power may well be held to be in them-
selves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the 
necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is 
reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), we stated 
that "[ w ]hether or not we would decide this case the same way under the 
rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before 
us." Id., at 609. The Court made the same point in Continental T.V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., supra, at 50, n. 16: 
"Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about 
the social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that 
anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of 
those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive conse-
quences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se 
rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or 
important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them." 
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on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the 
burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has 
become unreasonable through the mere variation of eco-
nomic conditions." Id., at 397-398. 
Thirteen years later, the Court could report that "for over 
forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation 
adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are un-
lawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of 
so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements 
were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as 
a defense." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 
U. S. 150, 218 (1940). In that case a glut in the spot market 
for gasoline had prompted the major oil refiners to engage in 
a concerted effort to purchase and store surplus gasoline in 
order to maintain stable prices. Absent the agreement, the 
companies argued, competition was cutthroat and self-defeat-
ing. The argument did not carry the day: 
"Any combination which tampers with price structures is 
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the mem-
bers of the price-fixing group were in no position to con-
trol the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, 
or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering 
with the free play of market forces. The Act places all 
such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital 
part of our economy against any degree of interference. 
Congress has not left with us the determination of 
whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise 
or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted 
the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive 
evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspiracies. It has 
no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses 
as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the 
good intentions of the members of the combination. If 
such a shift is to be made, it must be done by the Con-
gress. Certainly Congress has not left us with any such 
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choice. Nor has the Act created or authorized the cre-
ation of any special exception in favor of the oil industry. 
Whatever may be its peculiar problems and characteris-
tics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements 
are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to 
all industries alike." Id., at 221-222. 
The application of the per se rule to maximum price fixing 
agreements in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 
U. S. 211 (1951), followed ineluctably from Socony-Vacuum: 
"For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum 
prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby re-
strain their ability to sell in accordance with their own 
judgment. We reaffirm what we said in United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223: 'Under 
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose 
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, peg-
ging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate 
or foreign commerce is illegal per se.'" Id., at 213. 
Over the objection that maximum price fixing agreements 
were not the "economic equivalent" of minimum price fixing 
agreements, 17 Keifer-Stewart was reaffirmed in Albrecht v. 
Herald Co.,_ 390 U. S. 145 (1968): 
"Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different 
consequences in many situations. But schemes to fix 
maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous 
judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive 
market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers 
to compete and survive in that market. Competition, 
even in a single product, is not cast in a single mold. 
Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to 
furnish services essential to the value which goods have 
11 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
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for the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences 
which consumers desire and for which they are willing to 
pay. Maximum price fixing may channel distribution 
through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers 
who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice 
competition. Moreover, if the actual price charged 
under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the 
fixed maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the 
maximum price approaches the actual cost of the dealer, 
the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an ar- · 
rangement fixing minimum prices." Id., at 152-153 
(footnote omitted). 
We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule 
against price fixing. Indeed, in our most recent price fixing 
case we summarily reversed the decision of another Ninth 
Circuit panel that a horizontal agreement among competitors 
to fix credit terms does not necessarily contravene the anti-
trust laws. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 
643 (1980). 
B 
Our decisions foreclose the argument that the agreements 
at issue escape per se condemnation because they are hori-
zontal and fix maximum prices. Keifer-Stewart and Albrecht 
place horizontal agreements to fix maximum prices on the 
same legal-even if not economic-footing as agreements 
to fix minimum or uniform prices. 18 The per se rule "is 
grounded on faith in price competition as a market force [and 
not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price of eliminating 
18 It is true that in Keifer-Stewart, as in Albrecht, the agreement involved 
a vertical arrangement in which maximum resale prices were fixed. But 
the case also involved an agreement among competitors to impose the re-
sale price restraint. In any event, horizontal restraints are generally less 
defensible than vertical restraints. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., supra; Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 886, 890, n. 20 (1981). 
80-419-OPINION 
14 ARIZONA v. MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY 
competition." Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing 
Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 137, 142 
(1962). In this case the rule is violated by a price restraint 
that tends to provide the same economic rewards to all prac-
titioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their 
training, or their willingness to employ innovative and diffi-
cult procedures in individual cases. Such a restraint also 
may discourage entry into the market and may deter experi-
mentation and new developments . by individual entrepre-
neurs. It may be a masquerade for an agreement to fix uni-
form prices, or it may in the future take on that character. 
Nor does the fact that doctors-rather than nonprofession-
als-are the parties to the price fixing agreements support 
the respondents' position. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 788, n. 17 (1975), we stated that the "pub-
lic service aspect, and other features of the professions, may 
require that a particular practice, which could properly be 
viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, 
be treated differently." See National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 696 (1978). 
The price fixing agreements in this case, however, are not 
premised on public service or ethical norms. The respond-
ents do not argue, as did the defendants in Goldfarb and Pro-
fessional Engineers, that the quality of the professional serv-
ice that their members provide is enhanced by the price 
restraint. The respondents' claim for relief from the per se 
rule is simply that the doctors' agreement not to charge cer-
tain insureds more than a fixed price facilitates the successful 
marketing of an attractive insurance plan. But the claim 
that the price restraint will make it easier for customers to 
pay does not distinguish the medical profession from any 
other provider of goods or services. 
We are equally unpersuaded by the argument that we 
should not apply the per se rule in this case because the judi-
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ciary has little antitrust experience in the health care indus-
try. 19 The argument quite obviously is inconsistent with 
Socony-Vacuum. In unequivocal terms, we stated that, 
"[ w ]hatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, 
the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are con-
cerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all indus-
tries alike." 310 U. S., at 222. We also stated that "[t]he 
elimination of so-called competitive evils [in an industry] is no 
legal justification" for price fixing agreements, id., at 220, 
yet the Court of Appeals refused to apply the per se rule in 
this case in part because the health care industry was so far 
removed from the competitive model. 20 Consistent with our 
prediction in Socony-Vacuum, id., at 221, the result of this 
reasoning was the adoption by the Court of Appeals of a legal 
standard based on the reasonableness of the fixed prices, 21 an 
19 The argument should not be confused with the established position that 
a new per se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable 
rule of reason experience with the particular type of restraint challenged. 
See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253 (1963). Nor is our 
unwillingness to examine the economic justification of this particular appli-
cation of the per se rule against price fixing inconsistent with our reexami-
nation of the general validity of the per se rule rejected in Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., supra. 
20 "The health care industry, moreover, presents a particularly difficult 
area. The first step to understanding is to recognize that not only is ac-
cess to the medical profession very time consuming and expensive both for 
the applicant and society generally, but also that numerous government 
subventions of the costs of medical care have created both a demand and 
supply function for medical services that is artificially high. The present 
supply and demand functions of medical services in no way approximate 
those which would exist in a purely private competitive order. An accu-
rate description of those functions moreover is not available. Thus, we 
lack baselines by which could be measured the distance between the pres-
ent supply and demand functions and those which would exist under ideal 
competitive conditions." 643 F. 2d, at 556. 
21 "Perforce we must take industry as it exists, absent the challenged fea-
ture, as our baseline for measuring anticompetitive impact. The relevant 
inquiry becomes whether fees paid to doctors under that system would be 
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inquiry we have so often condemned. 22 Finally, the argu-
ment that the per se rule must be rejustified for every indus-
try that has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation 
ignores the rationale for per se rules, which in part is to avoid 
"the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged 
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry 
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to deter-
mine at large whether a particular restraint has been unrea-
sonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when under-
taken." Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, supra, at 5. 
The respondents' principal argument is that the per se rule 
is inapplicable because their agreements are alleged to have 
procompetitive justifications. The argument indicates a 
misunderstanding of the per se concept. The anticompet-
itive potential inherent in all price fixing agreements justifies 
their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications 
are offered for some. 23 Those claims of enhanced competition 
less than those payable under the FMC maximum fee agreement. Put dif-
ferently, confronted with an industry widely deviant from a reasonably 
free competitive model, such as agriculture, the proper inquiry is whether 
the practice enhances the prices charged for the services. In simplified 
economic terms, the issue is whether the maximum fee arrangement better 
permits the attainment of the monopolist's goal, viz., the matching of mar-
ginal cost to marginal revenue, or in fact obstructs that end." Id., at 556. 
22 In the first price fixing case arising under the Sherman Act, the Court 
was required to pass on the sufficiency of the defendants' plea that they 
had established rates that were actually beneficial to consumers. Assum-
ing the factual validity of the plea, the Court rejected the defense as a mat-
ter of law. UnitedStatesv. Trans-MissouriFreightAssn., 166 U.S. 290 
(1897). In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 
435 U. S. 679, 689 (1978), we referred to Judge Taft's "classic rejection of 
the argument that competitors may lawfully agree to sell their goods at the 
same price as long as the agreed-upon price is reasonable." See United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (CA61898), affd, 175 U. S. 
211 (1899). In our latest price fixing case, we reiterated the point: "It is 
no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable." Catalano, 
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643 647 (1980). 
23 "Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements 
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are so unlikely to prove significant in any particular case that 
we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in its general 
application. Even when the respondents are given every 
benefit of the doubt, the limited record in this case is not in-
consistent with the presumption that the respondents' agree-
ments will not significantly enhance competition. 
The respondents contend that their fee schedules are pro-
competitive because they make it possible to provide consum-
ers of health care with a uniquely desirable form of insurance 
coverage that could not otherwise exist. The features of the 
foundation-endorsed insurance plans that they stress are a 
choice of doctors, complete insurance coverage, and lower 
premiums. The first two characteristics, however, are 
hardly unique to these plans. Since only about 70% of the 
doctors in the relevant market are members of either founda-
tion, the guarantee of complete coverage only applies when 
an insured chooses a physician in that 70%. If he elects to go 
to a non-foundation doctor, he may be required to pay a por-
tion of the doctor's fee. It is fair to presume, however, that 
at least 70% of the doctors in other markets charge no more 
than the "usual, customary, and reasonable" fee that typical 
insurers are willing to reimburse in full. 24 Thus, in Maricopa 
and Pima Counties as well as in most parts of the country, if 
an insured asks his doctor if the insurance coverage is com-
plete, presumably in about 70% of the cases the doctor will 
say yes and in about 30% of the cases he will say no. 
It is true that a binding assurance of complete insurance 
coverage-as well as most of the respondents' potential for 
may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their 
reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential 
threat to the central nervous system of the economy." United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 224, n. 59 (1940). 
24 According to the respondents' figures, this presumption is well-
founded. See Brief for Respondents 42, n. 120. 
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lower insurance premiums 25-can be obtained only if the in-
surer and the doctor agree in advance on the maximum fee 
that the doctor will accept as full payment for a particular 
service. Even if a fee schedule is therefore desirable, it is 
not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing. 26 The 
record indicates that the Arizona Comprehensive Medical/ 
26 We do not perceive the respondents' claim of procompetitive justifica-
tion for their fee schedules to rest on the premise that the fee schedules 
actually reduce medical fees and accordingly reduce insurance premiums, 
thereby enhancing competition in the health insurance industry. Such an 
argument would merely restate the long rejected position that fixed prices 
are reasonable if they are lower than free competition would yield. It is 
arguable, however, that the existence of a fee schedule, whether fixed by 
the doctors or by the insurers, makes it easier-and to that extent less ex-
pensive-for insurers to calculate the risks that they underwrite and to ar-
rive at the appropriate reimbursement on insured claims. 
26 According to an FTC staff report, "Until the mid-1960's, most Blue 
Shield plans determined in advance how much to pay for particular proce-
dures and prepared fee schedules reflecting their determinations. Fee 
schedules are still used in approximately 25 percent of Blue Shield con-
tracts." Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Medical Par-
ticipation in Control of Blue Shield and Certain Other Open-Panel Medical 
Prepayment Plans 128 (1979). We do not suggest that Blue Shield plans 
are not actually controlled by doctors. Indeed, as the same report dis-
cusses at length, the belief that they are has given rise to considerable anti-
trust litigation. See also Kass & Pautler, Bureau of Competition, Federal 
Trade Commission, Physician Control of Blue Shield Plans (1979). Nor 
does this case present the question whether an insurer may, consistent 
with the Sherman Act, fix the fee schedule and enter into bilateral con-
tracts with individual doctors. That question was not reached in Group 
Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205 (1979). 
See id., at 210, n. 5. In an amicus curiae brief, the Department of Justice 
expressed its opinion that such an arrangement would be legal unless the 
plaintiffs could establish that a conspiracy among providers was at work. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Group Life & Health In-
surance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., O.T. 1978, No. 77-952, pp. 10-11. Our 
point is simply that the record provides no factual basis for the respond-
ents' claim that the doctors must fix the fee schedule. 
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Dental Program for Foster Children is administered by the 
Maricopa foundation pursuant to a contract under which the 
maximum fee schedule is prescribed by a state agency rather 
than by the doctors. 27 This program and the Blue Shield 
plan challenged in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. 
Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205 (1979), indicate that insurers 
are capable not only of fixing maximum reimbursable prices 
but also of obtaining binding agreements with providers 
guaranteeing the insured full reimbursement of a participat-
ing provider's fee. In light of these examples, it is not sur-
prising that nothing in the record even arguably supports the 
conclusion that this type of insurance program could not func-
tion if the fee schedules were set in a different way. 
The most that can be said for having doctors fix the maxi-
mum prices is that doctors may be able to do it more effi-
ciently than insurers. The validity of that assumption is far 
from obvious, 28 but in any event there is no reason to believe 
that any savings that might accrue from this arrangement 
would be sufficiently great to affect the competitiveness of 
these kinds of insurance plans. It is entirely possible that 
21 In that program the foundation performs the peer review function as 
well as the administrative function of paying the doctors' claims. 
28 In order to create an insurance plan under which the doctor would 
agree to accept as full payment a fee prescribed in a fixed schedule, some-
one must canvass the doctors to determine what maximum prices would be 
high enough to attract sufficient numbers of individual doctors to sign up 
but low enough to make the insurance plan competitive. In this case that 
canvassing function is performed by the foundation; the foundation then 
deals with the insurer. It would seem that an insurer could simply bypass 
the foundation by performing the canvassing function and dealing with the 
doctors itself. Under the foundation plan, each doctor must look at the 
maximum fee schedule fixed by his competitors and vote for or against ap-
proval of the plan (and, if the plan is approved by majority vote, he must 
continue or revoke his foundation membership). A similar, if to some ex-
tent more protracted, process would occur if it were each insurer that of-
fered the maximum fee schedule to each doctor. 
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the potential or actual power of the foundations to dictate the 
terms of such insurance plans may more than offset the theo-
retical efficiencies upon which the respondents' defense ulti-
mately rests. 29 
C 
Our adherence to the per se rule is grounded not only on 
economic prediction, judicial convenience, and business cer-
tainty, but also on a recognition of the respective roles of the 
Judiciary and the Congress in regulating the economy. 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., supra, at 611-612. 
Given its generality, our enforcement of the Sherman Act has 
required the Court to provide much of its substantive con-
tent. By articulating the rules of law with some clarity and 
by adhering to rules that are justified in their general appli-
cation, however, we enhance the legislative prerogative to 
amend the law. The respondents' arguments against appli-
cation of the per se rule in this case therefore are better di-
rected to the legislature. Congress may consider the excep-
tion that we are not free to read into the statute. 30 
IV 
29 In this case it appears that the fees are set by a group with substantial 
power in the market for medical services, and that there is competition 
among insurance companies in the sale of medical insurance. Under these 
circumstances the insurance companies are not likely to have significantly 
greater bargaining power against a monopoly of doctors than would indi-
vidual consumers of medical services. 
30 "[Congress] can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all 
cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory 
in order to maintain a flexible approach." United States v. Topco Asso-
ciates, Inc., supra, at 609, n. 10. Indeed, it has exempted certain indus-
tries from the full reach of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., 7 U. S. C. 
§§ 291-292 (Capper-Volstead Act, agricultural cooperatives); 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 1011-1013 (McCarran-Ferguson Act, insurance); 49 U. S. C. § 5b (Reed-
Bulwinkle Act, rail and motor carrier rate-fixing bureaus); 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1801 (newspaper joint operating agreements). 
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Having declined the respondents' invitation to cut back on 
the per se rule against price fixing, we are left with the re-
spondents' argument that their fee schedules involve price 
fixing in only a literal sense. For this argument, the 
respondents rely upon Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1 (1979). 
In Broadcast Music we were confronted with an antitrust 
challenge to the marketing of the right to use copyrighted 
compositions derived from the entire membership of ASCAP. 
The so-called "blanket license" was entirely different from 
the product that any one composer was able to sell by him-
self. 31 Although there was little competition among individ-
ual composers for their separate compositions, the blanket li-
cense arrangement did not place any restraint on the right of 
any individual copyright owner to sell his own compositions 
separately to any buyer at any price. 32 But a "necessary con-
sequence" of the creation of the blanket license was that its 
price had to be established. Id., at 21. We held that the 
delegation by the composers to ASCAP of the power to fix 
the price for the blanket license was not a species of the price 
fixing agreements categorically forbidden by the Sherman 
Act. The record disclosed price fixing only in a "literal 
81 "Thus, to the extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP 
is not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of many sell-
ers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the indi-
vidual compositions are raw material." 441 U. S. 1, 22 (1979) (footnote 
omitted). 
82 "Here, the blanket-license fee is not set by competition among individ-
ual copyright owners, and it is a fee for the use of any of the compositions 
covered by the license. But the blanket license cannot be wholly equated 
with a simple horizontal arrangement among competitors. ASCAP does 
set the price for its blanket license, but that license is quite different from 
anything any individual owner could issue. The individual composers and 
authors have neither agreed not to sell individually in any other market nor 
use the blanket license to mask price fixing in such other markets." Id., at 
23-24 (footnote omitted). 
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sense." Id., at 8. 
This case is fundamentally different. Each of the founda-
tions is composed of individual practitioners who compete 
with one another for patients. Neither the foundations nor 
the doctors sell insurance, and they derive no profits from the 
sale of health insurance policies. The members of the foun-
dations sell medical services. Their combination in the form 
of the foundation does not permit them to sell any different 
product. 33 Their combination has merely permitted them to 
sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and ar-
guably to affect the prevailing market price of medical care. 
The foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other 
joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be 
competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as 
well as the opportunities for profit. In such joint ventures, 
the partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with 
other sellers in the market. The agreement under attack is 
an agreement among hundreds of competing doctors concern-
ing the price at which each will offer his own services to a 
substantial number of consumers. It is true that some are 
surgeons, some anesthesiologists, and some psychiatrists, 
but the doctors do not sell a package of three kinds of serv-
ices. If a clinic offered complete medical coverage for a flat 
fee, the cooperating doctors would have the type of partner-
ship arrangement in which a price fixing agreement among 
the doctors would be perfectly proper. But the fee agree-
ments disclosed by the record in this case are among inde-
38 It may be true that by becoming a member of the foundation the indi-
vidual practitioner obtains a competitive advantage in the market for medi-
cal services that he could not unilaterally obtain. That competitive advan-
tage is the ability to attract as customers people who value both the 
guarantee of full health coverage and a choice of doctors. But, as we have 
indicated, the setting of the price by doctors is not a "necessary conse-
quence" of an arrangement with an insurer in which the doctor agrees not 
to charge certain insured customers more than a fixed price. 
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pendent competing entrepreneurs. They fit squarely into 
the horizontal price fixing mold. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part 
in the consideration or decision of this case. 
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